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This dissertation comprises three chapters that contribute to a broader and an ongoing discussion
in the macroeconomics, international economics and development economics literature. Specifi-
cally, the first chapter focuses on understanding how shocks to long-term U.S debt held by foreign
official institutions such as foreign central banks and foreign ministries of finance affect the U.S
economy. In the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium(DSGE) model with imperfect
asset substitution between short and long-term government bonds, I find that shocks to long-term
U.S debt held by foreign official institutions have expansionary effects on the economy–they lower
the long-term interest rate and increase output, consumption and inflation. This result is sup-
ported by empirical findings from a structural vector autoregression model (SVAR). The second
chapter advances the study of foreign aid fungibility by showing how subtle characteristics of
household behavior interact with fungible aid and institutional factors to impact aid effective-
ness. Specifically, I build a simple dynamic optimizing model and show that the way consumers
internalize an aid induced increase in government spending can have very contrasting impacts on
aid effectiveness– a feature absent in the extensive empirical literature. Finally, the third chapter
studies how different discretionary government spending policy options impact the consequences
of explosive government transfer payments. I employ a DSGE model with a fiscal limit– a point
where higher taxation is no longer a feasible financing for this study.
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Chapter 1
Foreign Official Holdings of U.S
Treasuries, Stock Effect and the
Economy: A DSGE Approach
1
Abstract
Previous studies focus on quantifying the effect of foreign official holdings of long-term U.S Treasuries
(FOHL) on the long-term interest rate. The consensus is that FOHL has a large and negative effect
on the long-term interest rate. Long-term interest rates matter in determining aggregate demand, but
most studies discount the macroeconomic implications of FOHL on the U.S economy. This chapter
extends the literature and studies the macroeconomic implications of FOHL shocks through their impact
on the long-term interest rate in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model
treats short and long-term government bonds as imperfect substitutes through endogenous portfolio
adjustment frictions(costs). Three main findings emerge from the baseline model: (1) a positive shock to
FOHL impacts the long-term interest rate negatively through a stock effect channel– defined as persistent
changes in interest rate as a result of movement along the Treasury demand curve. This result is consistent
with the empirical literature; (2) the decline in the long-term interest rate creates favorable economic
conditions that feed back into the economy and increases consumption, output and inflation through
an endogenous term structure implied by the model and; (3) the monetary authority responds to the
increase in inflation and output by raising the short-term interest rate. The simultaneous increase in the
short-term interest rate and the fall in the long-term interest rate causes the term spread to fall. This last
result sheds light on the decoupling of interest rates observed between 2004-2006, a phenomenon known
as the “Greenspan Conundrum”.
JEL: E43, E52, E58, F21, G12




The U.S bond market plays a vital role on the global economy as well as the daily lives of every
American. Through debt issuance, the government uses the bond market to borrow internationally
and domestically in order to carry out key governmental spending on highways, bridges, military
spending amongst other government programs. These governmental programs in turn create
thousands of new jobs for the unemployed.1 Furthermore, for several forward looking households
in the economy, the bond market plays an essential role in their economic planning decisions
including consumption, investment and savings both in the short and long-run.
These points underscore the fact that it is näıve to discount the macroeconomic implications
of the actions and interactions of major holders of U.S debt such as foreign official institutions
on the U.S economy. It is worth mentioning that excluding the Federal Reserve holdings of long-
term goverment bonds, the share of outstanding long-term U.S Treasuries held by foreign officials
increased from 13 percent of outstanding long-term debt in January 1990 to about 50 percent by
June 2011.2 This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study and
understand the macroeconomic implications of FOHL.
To further elucidate the importance of studying the macroeconomic implications of FOHL,
consider figure 1.1 and figure 1.2. As shown in figure 1.1, between July 2004 and July 2006,
the 1-year interest rate increased from 1.24 percent to 5.22 percent (approximately 320 percent
increase) following the Federal reserve tightening of policy rates, however, the 10-year interest rate
only increased from 3.89 percent to 5.09 percent (approximately 34 percent increase).3 The term
spread which is given by the gray line fell during this period and in some cases attained negative
values.4 More importantly, other key factors at the time that included rising energy prices and
1See for instance Morrison and Labonte (2011) for the examination of the importance to the U.S economy of
China’s investments in U.S Treasuries.
2 Foreign officials consists of foreign ministries of finance, foreign central banks such as Bank of Japan, Bank of
England, Central Bank of Republic of China and other foregin governmental institutions. The percentage of FOHL
debt when the Feds holdings are included in outstanding debt is about 33 percent. This is still a significant share.
3The Federal Funds Target rate was raised from 2 percent to 5.25 percent in 0.25 percent increments at seventeen
consecutive meetings.
4The spread between the 10-year yield and 1-year yield is given by the 10-year yield minus the 1-year yield.
3
robust real economic activity that tend to impact long-term interest rates positively in the past
made the slow response of long-interest rates to the increase in short-term interest rates more
unusual (Rudesbusch et al. (2006)).
This situation presented a deviation from the conventional wisdom that long-term inter-
est rates will normally move in the same direction as short-term interest rates after controlling
for expectations and other risk factors.5 The sluggish increase in long-term interest rates while
short-term rates increased sharply was referred to as the “Greenspan Conundrum”. Large asset
purchases by foreign official institutions have been shown to have significantly contributed to the
Conundrum.6 This point succinctly highlights the significant role of foreign official agents in pric-
ing of assets in the U.S which are important determinants for intertemporal economic decisions of
domestic households.
Moreover, in figure 1.2, monthly long-term bond holding of U.S Treasuries held by foreign
official institutions is compared to the Federal Reserve’s holding over the period January 1990 to
June 2011. It is clear that FOHL has consistently been higher than the Federal Reserve holdings.
The striking observation from the figure is that, even at the time of the quantitative easing
(specifically, QE2- from November 2010 to June 2011), FOHL was approximately two times the
Fed holdings of long term bonds.
It is important to note that the quantitative easing and FOHL are both forms of large asset
purchases of long and medium term bonds. However, while the quantitative easing was specifi-
cally used as an unconventional policy tool to lower long-term interest rates at the Zero Lower
Bound with a goal of stimulating the economy, not much is known about how FOHL affects the
macroeconomy.7 Moreover, large asset purchases by foreign official institutions take place in the
absence of monetary policy constraint such as Zero Lower Bound, hence they can have unpleasant
implications– e.g. the Conundrum – given that monetary policy can be active during such large
5See for instance, the Expectation Hypothesis Theorem.
6See Bernanke et al. (2004); Warnock and Warnock (2009); Sierra (2010); Bertaut et al. (2011); Beltran et al
(2013) and Kaminska and Zinna (2014), Kohn (2015) for example. An exception to this finding is Rudesbusch et
al. (2006) who find no effect of foreign official asset purchases of U.S Treasuries on the long-term interest rate.
7See for example Joyce et al. (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Swanson (2011), Falagiarda (2014) for evidence
of the effectiveness of Quantitative Easing policy in the U.S.
4
asset purchases.
This paper draws motivation from the aforementioned examples and examines the macroe-
conomic implications of large asset purchases by foreign official agents. Specifically, the paper
focuses on investigating the impact of FOHL on major macroeconomic variables including con-
sumption, output and inflation through FOHL effect on the long-term interest rate.8 To see this
connection, consider the example of inter-temporal decisions by households in an economy. Inter-
temporal decisions on savings, investment, and consumption depend not only on the dynamics the
of short-term interest rates, but also on the long-term interest rate and the term spread.9 That
is, all other things being equal, low interest rates, both short and long, create favorable economic
conditions that stimulate real economic activity.10
The key link to studying the implications of shocks to FOHL on the economy is through
its impact on the long-term interest rate. Thus, in order to examine the effect of FOHL on the
long-term interest rate and its subsequent implications on the macroeconomy, the standard DSGE
model employed in this paper is modified to include these three key ingredients: (i) long-term
government debt; (ii) endogenous financial cost term; and (iii) non-zero-exogenous foreign official
holding of long term bonds.
The endogenous financial cost term allows for imperfect substitution between short and long-
term government bonds. Specifically, following Tobin (1969,1982), Andrés et al.(2004) and more
recently Falagiarda (2015), the paper introduces an endogenous financial cost term in the form of
a portfolio adjustment costs into a DSGE model.11
Imperfect substitution exists between short and long-term bonds because households ratio-
nalize that they lose liquidity any time they hold long-term bonds relative to holding short term
8FOHL forms 70 percent of total foreign official holdings, see figure 1.3.
9For example Andés et al. (2004) shows that the long-term interest rate unambigiously affects aggregate demand.
Moreover, Marzo et. al (2008) provides an empirical and theoretical support for the feedback channel from the
term- structure to the macroeconomy. Rudesbush et al. (2007) instead find that although there is no reverse
relationship from the term-premium to the economy structurally, reduced form empirical analysis suggests that
falls in the term structure is usually associated with stimulus to real economic activity.
10Section 3 provides a simple graphical intuition on this example.
11For more on portfolio adjustment friction see for instance Marzo et al. (2008), Falagiarda and Marzo (2012),
Harrison (2011), Falagiarda(2014). See also D’Amico and King (2013) for empirical evidence of imperfect substi-
tution or segmentation within the Treasury market.
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bonds. Hence, households perceive entering the long-term bond market as riskier because longer-
term bonds are illiquid relative to the same investment in shorter term bonds. For this reason,
households internalize the loss of liquidity by holding additional short-term bonds to compensate
themselves of the loss of liquidity anytime they hold long-term bonds. Households therefore self-
impose a reserve requirement on their long-term investment in the form of liquidity costs associated
with holding them.12
The endogenous financial cost term then permits for simultaneous examination of (i) how
shocks to FOHL affect the long-term interest through the stock effect channel, defined as persistent
changes in price and hence interest rate that result from movements along the Treasury demand
curve and include the market reaction due to changes in expectations about future withdraws
of supply of Treasuries13 (ii) the shocks implications on the macroeconomy through a feedback
channel from the endogenous term-structure implied by the model.
FOHL is modelled so that it is an exogenous time varying share of long-term outstanding
government debt thus they evolve indepedently of bond prices. This modelling stance on FOHL is
in line with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) who show that foreign officials’ demand
for U.S Treasuries is inelastic. Essentially, a foreign central bank accumulates more dollar reserves
in response to receipt of a dollar capital inflow– buying Treasuries regardless of their prices relative
to other assets. Moreover, these foreign officials demand for Treasuries are only slightly sensitive
to risk-return considerations.14
The model is approximated to the first order and solved numerically using Dynare. The
impulse response functions from shocks to FOHL in the model are then studied. The findings
from the model show that FOHL plays an important role in the economy and their actions have
12See Andrés et al. (2004)
13See D’Amico and King (2010) for more on the stock effect. I elaborate more on the stock effect channel in my
model in section 4.3.
14In constrast, recent surveys of central banks show that most reserve managers do change their reserve portfolios
in response to changes in Treasury prices and other macroeconomic variables. Specifically, foreign official institutions
optimize their foreign reserve portfolio, hence they are in fact endogenous (See for instance, Beltran et. al (2013);
Borio, Galati and Heath (2008); Pringle and Carver (2002)).The focus of this paper is not to study the factors
that drive foreign official holding of U.S Treasuries. Thus to keep the model tractable without losing its ability to
answer the main questions examined in this paper, I follow studies such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012) and Warnock and Warnock (2009) by treating FOHL as exogenous.
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expansionary effects on the economy. In particular, in the baseline results, positive shocks from
FOHL in the form of large purchases of U.S Treasuries affect the long-term interest rate negatively
through the stock effect channel onn impact. This negative impact on the long-term interest rate
generates a feedback mechanism from the endogenous term structure to the economy which creates
favorable economic conditions that stimulates the economy leading to an increase in consumption,
output and inflation. Moreover, since the monetary authority responds to inflation hawkishly with
some degree of policy inertia, short-term interest rates increase. The simultaneous fall in long-term
interest rates and increase in short-term interest rate causes the term spread to fall. This last
result sheds light on the mechanisms behind the interest rate Conundrum between 2004-2006.
Othe key findings are:
1. The degree of persistence of the FOHL shock demonstrates that the effect of FOHL on the
long-term interest rate can range from no impact to a sizeable negative impact on the long-
term interest rate. Particularly, when the persistence of FOHL is high, shocks to FOHL
have no effect on the long-term interest rate. In constrast, when the persistence is low the
shock has a significant and negative impact on the long-term interest rate on impact. This
finding in the model is key to understanding the mixed result of the effect of FOHL on the
long-term interest rate that exist in the literature. In all cases however, the model predicts
a consistent negative effect of the shock on the term spread and the term premium.
2. Given different degrees of persistence of FOHL and imperfect asset substitution, FOHL
shocks have similar effects on consumption and output as in the baseline results. However,
high (low) degrees of persistence of FOHL and imperfect asset substitions between the assets
causes a longer(faster) return of the term spread to its steady-state generating higher (lower)
feedback from the endogenous term structure over time. This yields higher (lower) peak
values for consumption and output respectively.
The key assumptions and features in the model are incorporated into a five-variable structural
near-VAR model to assess the empirical implication of the model. The empiral results from the
near-VAR model complement the core results from the DSGE model.
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1.2 Related Literature
There is an extensive empirical literature that employs different empirical models ranging from
excess returns regression, term premium regressions, cointegrated vector autoregression models to
no-arbitrage models to estimate the impact of FOHL on the long-term interest rate. The general
consensus is that foreign official holdings have a significant and negative impact on the long term
interest rate (Bernanke et al. (2004); Warnock and Warnock (2009); Sierra (2010); Bernanke et
al. (2004); Bertaut et al. (2011); Beltran et al. (2013) and Kaminska and Zinna (2014)).15 An
equally important but exception to this finding is Rudesbusch et al. (2006). Employing an affine
no-arbitrage macro-finance model, they find no effect of foreign official asset purchases of U.S
Treasuries on the long-term interest rate.
In a literature that has predominantly focused on examining the empirical effects of FOHL
on the long-term interest rate, the primary contribution of this paper is to examine the macroe-
conomic effects of FOHL on the U.S economy in the context of a DSGE model.16 This is achieved
by studying the effect of shocks to FOHL on the long-term interest rate through the stock ef-
fect channel and their consequent effects on the economy through a feedback mechanisms from
the model implied endogenous term-structure. Both the stock effect and feedback mechanism is
facilitated by the introduction of portfolio adjustment frictions (costs).
In addition, the paper is able to shed light on an explicit transmission channel– stock effect
channel– of how FOHL impacts the long-term interest rate in a context of a DSGE model. In
the baseline result, FOHL impacts the long-term interest rate negatively. This result is captured
through the stock effect channel generated by the introduction of portfolio adjustment costs.17
15See also Bernanke (2005), who argues that unconventional movements of the long term rates is as a result of a
global savings glut (GSG) hypothesis. The GSG hypothesis explains that increased capital inflows from countries
in which desired savings greatly exceeded desired investment including Asia emerging markets and commodity
exporters were an important reason that US longer term interest rates during this period were lower than expected.
16See Favilukis et al. (2012) and Favilukis et al. (2014) for other macroeconomic outcomes (housing price and
wealth effects) of large Asset Purchases by Foreign Officials.
17Kohn (2015) in a consumption based asset pricing model examines one transmission mechanism by assuming
that foreign official purchases of U.S debt directly funds domestic consumption growth. Consumption growth is
central in the pricing of these asset via the stochastic discount factor in their model. Hence, foreign official purchases
affect the yields on long-term bonds through consumption growth. His model abstracts away from monetary policy.
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Although the channel and results are not new, the approach employed in this paper to study the
effect of FOHL shocks on the long-term interest rate is different from the empirical methodolo-
gies usually employed in existing studies. Hence, the baseline results from the model serve as a
robustness check for the results in literature.18
Moreover, the flexibility of the model allows for a deeper understanding and a panoptic view of
how certain characteristics of foreign official institutions, such as the persistence of their holdings
of U.S Treasuries can impact the effect of FOHL on the long-term interest rate – a feature not
readily observed in the studies above. The effects of such characteristics are studied through
sensitivity analysis on the parameter that governs the degree of persistence of FOHL. The results
from the sensitivity analysis lends another important contribution to the literature by unifying,
in one framework, the constrasting effects of FOHL on the long-term interest rate found in the
literature.
A low persistence of FOHL in the model shows that FOHL shocks can have a decently large
and negative effect on the long-term interest rate. This is consistent with most of the results in the
literature (Bernanke et al. (2004); Warnock and Warnock (2009); Sierra (2010); Bernanke et al.
(2004); Bertaut et al. (2011); Beltran et al. (2013) and Kaminska and Zinna (2014)). However,
high persistence of FOHL shows that shocks to FOHL have no effect on the long-term interest
rate, a result similar to those found in Rudesbusch et al. (2006).
Lastly, unlike the other studies, this paper models monetary policy explicitly in a form of
a reaction function and thus provides a different perspective on the interest rate Conundrum
observed between 2004-2006 in the U.S. Specifically, monetary policy responds to the expansionary
effects of FOHL by increasing short-term interest rates hawkishly.19 Meanwhile, long-term interest
rate are down and respond sluggishly to the increase in short-term interest rate due to the persistent
negative stock effect of FOHL. This leads to a decoupling of long-term rate from short-term interest
This paper instead models monetary policy explicitly and studies the transmission mechanism of FOHL through
the stock effect channel generated by imperfect substitution between long and short term bonds.
18See Warnock and Warnock (2009) and Beltran et al. (2013).
19It is important to note that, during this period (the mid 2000s) monetary policy was “active” – it responded
to increases in inflation and output by increasing policy rate.
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rate causing the term spread to fall a result consistent with the Greenspan Conundrum.
1.3 Graphical Intuition
Before introducing the full model, a simple graphical exposition is employed to explain the mech-
anism through which large asset purchases by other agents apart from households, in this case
foreign official agents can affect the economy. To do this, three basic economic relationships are
employed: (i) demand and supply of long-term Treasuries; (ii) the inverse relationship between
bond prices and their interest rates and (iii) the negative relationship between output and the real
interest rate (Long-term interest rate augmented- IS curve).
Furthermore, for illustration purposes the following simplifying assumptions are made. The
supply of long-term bonds, SL is assumed to be inelastic so that foreign official purchases only
affect the composition of outstanding supply. It is also assumed that inflation expectations are
“well-anchored” – they can be taken as fixed and exogenous so that changes in the nominal and
real interest rates are one in the same thing. Consider figure A below.
Figure A.1 shows the demand and supply of long-term government bonds. Households demand
for long-term bonds are negatively related to bond prices and given by DL. Without foreign official
purchases, ∆FP = 0, supply of long term bonds available to households is S̄L and the corresponding
equilibrium price and quantity are PD and B
D
L respectively. Now given that exogenous foreign
officials increase their holdings by purchasing a positive amount of long-term bonds, ∆FP > 0 at
any given price, relative supply of long-term bonds available to households falls to SDFL . With
demand high and supply of these assets low, the equilibrium price of long-term bonds increases
from PD to PDF while equilibrium quantity for households falls to B
DF
L . Invoking the negative
relationship between the price of bonds and interest rates depicted in figure A.2, the increase in




It is important to note that in standard DSGE models, long-term interest rates and hence
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Figure A.1: Long-Term Bond Market with Exogenous























Figure A.3: Long-Term Interest Rate Augmented IS curve
relative bond supply do not play any explicit role in the determination of aggregate demand.
Specifically, there is only one interest rate, the short-term rate and its expected path implicitly
determines the long-term leaving no room for a separate role for the long-term interest rate and
hence supply (quantity) of bonds. However, as shown in figures A.1 and A.2, relative supply of
long-term bonds can impact the long-term interest rate independent of short-term interest rates.
This implies that long-term interest rates are not simply a function of short-term interest rates
but also a function of their relative quantity supplied. Hence without loss of generality, consider
a representative interest rate of the economy, iL(BL, iS), a function of long-term bond supply and
11
short-term interest rate, iS. Call this representative interest rate a composite interest rate (CIR).
The CIR suggests that both long-term and short term interest rates matter in the determi-
nation of aggregate demand (e.g. Andrés et al.(2004) shows that long-term interest rates unam-
bigously play a role in influencing aggregate demand).20 Now employing the negative relationship
between aggegate demand and the real interest rate, figure A.3 shows the long-term interest rate
augmented IS curve, IS∗.
The transimission mechanism of large asset purchases by foreign officials is as follows: In
figure 1.A, a large asset purchase by foreign officials reduces outstanding supply of long-term
bonds available to households from S̄L to S
DF
L . This bids up the price of long-term bonds from PD
to PDF . Given the negative relationship between bond prices and interest rate, the increase in price
decreases the interest rates on long-term bonds from iDL to i
DF
L as shown in figure 2.A. Holding
inflation expectation and the short-term interest rate constant, the CIR falls from i∗L(B
D
L , iS) to
i∗L(B
DF
L , iS) following the large asset purchase by foreign officials. The decrease in i
∗
L stimulates
the economy and leads to an increase in aggregate demand from Y1 to Y2 as depicted in figure
A.3.21
1.4 A DSGE Model with Foreign Official Holding of U.S Treasuries
This section presents the full model. The model comprises a representative agent who populates
the economy and supplies labor inputs for firms; a monopolistically competitive firm that hires
the labor to produce differentiated goods; a final good firm who purchases the intermediate goods
to produce final goods; a government sector that conducts both monetary policy– by targeting
inflation and the output gap with some degree of monetary policy inertia to stabilize economic
20In this case we abstract from the short-term interest rate by assuming it to be constant. The full model the
role of short-term interest rate.
21 Notice that since supply of bonds are positively related to interest rate we have ∂iL∂BL > 0 as demonstrated
in figure A.1 and A.2 above. Moreover, from standard arbitrage conditions long-term interest rates are positively
related to the short-term interest rate hence ∂iL∂iS > 0. The interaction effect of changes in bond supply and the
substitute price, short-term interest rate, ∂
2iL
∂BL∂iS
, on the long-term interest rate can be ambigious and it depends
on the relative magnitude of each effect as well as inflation expectations. For simplicity we assume this effect to be
zero in the graphical exposition. The full model captures this interactive effect.
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fluctuation– and fiscal policy by levying lump-sum taxes on households as well as issuing both
short and long-term debt to generate revenue for government spending. Lastly, there is a foreign
official agent whose demand for long-term government bonds is an exogenous evolving share of
outstanding long-term government bonds.
1.4.1 Households
There is a representative agent who lives infinitely. The agent gains utility by choosing consump-























where χ > 0, ϑ >; γ > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion, η > 0 is the elasticity of money
demand; θ > 0 is the habit formation parameter and ϕ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity








with β ∈ (0, 1) as the discount factor. Since there is a continuum of consumption goods available











where i ∈ (0, 1) represent the continuum of differentiated final goods and ε > 1 governs the
elasticity of substitution between different final goods.
The household’s budget constraint which incorporates the secondary market for bond trading as



























The household agent allocates wealth between money holding, Mt and two zero-coupon bonds
which differ in maturity, these bonds are purchased at their nominal prices. The bonds are short
term bonds and long term bonds denoted Bt and B
H
L,t respectively. Bt yields Rt and B
H
L,t yields
RL,t. The budget constraint of households reveals an active secondary market as proposed by
Ljunquist and Sargent (2004).
Particularly, the right hand side of the household budget constraint shows that long term
bonds BHL,t−1 are priced with short-term rates, that is, the agent carries over long term bonds
purchased at time t−1 and sells it on the secondary market at the rate 1/Rt. However, at time t−1,
an agent who buys long-term bonds and intends to sell them in period t faces price uncertainty as
Rt is not known at time t−1.22 This formulation of the budget contraint to incorporate secondary
market allows for a straightforward modelling of assets of different maturities. Moreover, this
helps to capture the active participation of foreign central banks on the secondary market.
In line with Andrés et al. (2004), Falagiarda and Marzo (2012), Harrison (2012) and Falargiada
(2014), the paper assumes that intratemporal trading between bonds of different maturities is
costly to agents thus they pay a cost whenever they shift the portfolio allocation between short











where φL > 0 and κL = B
H
L,t/Bt is the inverse of steady state household holding of short-term to
long-term bonds. This implies that ρt is zero at steady state. The financial friction term allows
for imperfect substitutability between long and short term bonds.
22As explained by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) the price Rt follows from a simple arbitrage arguments, in
period t, these bonds represent identical sure claims to consumption goods at the time of the end of the maturity
as newly issued one-period bonds in period t. See also Falagiarda (2014) for a similar formulation of long-term
bonds.
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There are several motivation for including the transaction cost friction. However following
Andrés et al (2004), its argued that households perceive entering the long term bond market as
riskier, that is, they are illiquid relative to the same investment in shorter term bonds. Thus as
they purchase long-term bonds, they hold additional short-term bonds to compensate themselves
of the loss of liquidity. Specifically, households in effect self-impose a reserve requirement on their
long-term investment.23
1.4.2 Optimality Conditions
The first order conditions for the optimizing consumer’s problem is given as:



























































Equation (2.6) represents the marginal utility of wealth and it depends on the marginal utility
23Other justifications for including the portfolio friction is the theory of preferred habitat by Vayanos and Vila
(2009). Secondly, as in Falagiarda (2014), one can rationalize these costs as proxies for the shares of resources
devoted to covering information costs or costs of managing bond portfolio.
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of consumption today and the expected marginal utility of consumption tomorrow generated by the
presence of habits in consumer preferences. Equation (1.7) relates real wage to the marginal rate of
substitution between labor hours and consumption. Equation (2.6) and (2.9) can be combined to
obtain an expression for money demand. Finally, equation (1.9) and (1.10) are the Euler equations
for short and long term bond holdings respectively. As it is standard in the literature, we will
show below that those two equations implicitly reveal a term structure relationship linking long
and short term rates. 24
1.4.3 Stock Effect Channel and Feedback Mechanism
To gain insight of the channel through which foreign official holdings affect the long term rate and
hence the term spread in this model, I combine the log-linearized first order conditions of short
and long term bond holdings, equations (1.9) and (1.10).25 This yields:
R̃L,t = R̃t + η1EtR̃t+1 + η2Et(λ̃t+1 − π̃t+1)− η3(b̃t − b̃HL,t) (1.11)
or
Term Spread = R̃L,t − R̃t = η1EtR̃t+1 + η2Et(λ̃t+1 − π̃t+1)− η3 (b̃t − b̃HL,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stock Effect
(1.12)
where η3 = φL(1 +
κL
R̄
) > 0 and η1 and η2 are convolutions of steady state values and structural
parameters.26 The stock effect is captured in the last term of equation (2.13), this is due to
the imperfect substitutability between the bonds in this model. Equation (2.13) is consistent
with Tobin’s argument that relative supply of different assets affects the spreads of these assets.
Notice that, the portfolio cost parameter, φL, governs the degree to which relative bond holding
movements along the Treasury demand curve affects the long-term rates. If φL is equal to zero
(i.e. η3 = 0), equation (2.12) reduces to a form of expectation hypothesis and the stock effect is
absent.
24Similar results can be found in Andrés et al (2004), Marzo et al (2008) and Falargiada (2014)










From equation (2.12), long-term rates depends positively on long term bond supply b̃HL,t. Short
term bond supply on the other hand affects the long-term rate negatively. Hence persistent increase
in long-term bond holdings by foreign official institutions reduces the relative supply of long-term
bonds available to households. The long-term rate then falls given its positive relationship with
long-term bond supply b̃HL,t.
An important feature which is central to studying the effects of shocks to foreign official
holdings of long term bonds is the feedback channel from the model implied term structure to the
macroeconomy. To see this feature, the log-linearized for equation for consumption and the first
order condition of long-term bonds are combined to yield:
C̃t = η4EtC̃t+1 − η5R̃t+1 − η5R̃L,t + ...+ η7Etπ̃t+1 (1.13)
Equation (2.14) shows that both long-term rate and short-term rate are equally important
in impacting current consumption. Moreover, in the case where policy rates are at the Zero
Lower Bound (ZLB), it is clear that long-term rates play a much more direct role in impacting
aggregate demand.27 However, in this paper where focus is on the pre-ZLB period monetary policy
is active. Hence, when long-term rates are not in tandem with short-term rates, as in the case of
the Greenspan Conundrum, the two rates can have conflicting effects on current consumption.28
Hence, the impact of a derivative of the two rates— in this case the simple spread between the
long-term rates and the short-term rate— on current consumption needs to be considered. To see
this, equation (2.14) can be rewritten such that:
C̃t = η4EtC̃t+1 − η5,6R̃t − η6 (R̃L,t − R̃t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term Spread
+...+ η7Etπ̃t+1 (1.14)
Equation (1.14) shows that apart from future consumption, expected inflations and short-term
27I refer to aggregate demand here because in a simple case where one assumes away government expenditure
and investment, the market clearing condition will be Yt = Ct in which case equation 2.14 become Ỹt = η4EtỸt −
η5R̃t+1 − η5R̃L,t + ...+ η7Etπ̃t+1. See Falagiarda (2014) for the treatment of the ZLB and Quantitative Easing in
a similar context.
28 This reiterates the importance of including not only short-term into the analysis of aggregate demand but also
a separate role for long-term rates needs to be accounted for by including long-term bonds.
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rates, falls in the term spread affects consumption positively and through the resource constraint
and other general equilibrium forces can increase aggregate output and affect all the macroeco-
nomic variable present in the model. The latter point can be elucidated as follows.
Suppose the economy is hit by a positive shock that initially stimulates consumption and
hence increases inflation and output. Now since the monetary authority responds actively to
inflation, it will increase policy rates. From equation (1.14), the increase in policy rates will
decrease consumption. However, if long-term rates responds sluggishly (i.e. R̃L,t < R̃t) to the
increases in policy rates due to other factors such as the persistence of stock effect, then from
equation (1.14), this can result in falls in the term spread. The fall in the term spread in turn can
further lead to stimulating consumption.29 In conclusion, monetary policy goals can be stifled by
deviations of the long-term rates from short-term rates. This is the channel that shocks to FOHL
affects the real economy in the model.
1.4.4 Production of Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods producing firm i has access to a constant returns to scale technology,
Yt(i) = ANt(i)
where Yt(i) is output of the intermediate firm i and Nt(i) is the amount of labor the firm hires.
The firm thus minimizes its total cost subject to the production technology.
1.4.5 Price setting
A final goods producing firm purchases intermediate inputs at nominal price Pt(i) and produces








ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Profit-maximization by the final goods
29Rudesbush et al. (2007) for instance finds that reduced form empirical analysis suggests that falls in the term
structure is usually associated with stimulus to real economic activity.
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Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producing firm i chooses price Pt(i) to maximize










is the household’s stochastic discount factor, Dt(i) are nominal profits for firm






















where ψ ≥ 0 governs adjustment costs, Ψt(i) is real marginal cost. Price adjustments are intro-
duced through Rotemberg (1982) quadratic costs of adjustment reflecting the negative effect that
price changes can have on firm-customer relationship. In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms make
identical decisions and hence the first order condition is given as follows:


















1.4.6 Foreign Official Holdings
As explained earlier, to keep the model simple and tractable without losing its ability to answer the
main questions examined in this paper, FOHL are modelled as an exogenous time varying share
of long-term outstanding government debt.30 Particularly, I assume that long-term foreign official
holding denoted by BFL,t is a share xt of outstanding long term debt and xF,t evolves exogenously
30 For example Warnock and Warnock (2009) assume foreign official holdings as exogenous when estimating its
effect on interest rates. See also Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for empirical evidence.
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according to an AR(1) process. Hence,












where xF = B
F
L /BL is the steady state values of xt.
1.4.7 Demand for Long-Term Bonds






where BL,t are outstanding government long-term bonds.
1.4.8 The Government
Government expenditure is financed by seigniorage revenues, issuance of long-term, Lump sum



















Furthermore, I model the issuance of new long term bonds to follow an AR(1) process so that
shocks to foreign official demand for long term bonds only affects the composition of outstanding

























where φG ∈ (0, 1) and εGt is an i.i.d shock with zero mean and standard deviation σG
Lump sum taxes Tt is a function of the total government liabilities:















where ζ0 is the steady-state level of Tt, and ζ1, ζ2 have been set equal so taxes respond equally to
short and long-term debt.
Finally, the central bank conducts monetary policy with a short-term interest rate feedback





















hence Rt inflation and output through ρπ and ρY respectively with an interest rate smoothing
component governed by ρR. The exogenous policy shifter in monetary policy, ε
R
t is assumed to be
a white noise monetary policy disturbance.
1.4.9 Resource Constraint
With the introduction of endogenous financial cost frictions, aggregate output of the economy
is not simply allocated to consumption, government expenditure and price adjustment costs but
also to a portfolio adjustment cost term which is priced in output. Thus the model is closed by a
resource constraint given as:
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This section presents the solution process and results of the model outlined in section 3. Simula-
tions are conducted to study the impact of FOHL shocks on key macroeconomic variables using
a calibrated version of the model. The model is log-linearized around its steady state and solved
using Dynare. In what follows, the calibration of key parameters are discussed and then the re-
sults of the baseline model is analyzed. Finally, sensitivity analyses are carried out to examine
the effects of varying the key parameters of the model, that is, the parameter governing portfolio
costs (φL) and the persistence parameter for the share of FOHL (ρx).
1.5.1 Calibration
The baseline model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency to match the behavior U.S data prior
to the financial crisis in 2008.31 A subset of the parameters are chosen based on previous studies
and are standard in the literature. Specifically, following for instance Fuhrer (2000) the habit
formation parameter θ is set to 0.7. The discount factor is set at 1.04−1/4, which implies a steady-
state annualized real interest rate of 4 percent. The implied steady-state real long-term interest
rate is then given by R/β. Preferences over consumption are logarithmic, hence γ = 1. The Frisch
labor supply elasticity is set to unity, so ϕ = 1 and χ is set such that the steady state share of
time spent in employment is 1/3. As mentioned earlier, intermediate goods-producing firms use
a constant returns to scale production function. The common technology parameter, A is set to
normalize the deterministic steady state level of output to 1.
The parameter that determines the interest elasticity of real money balances, η is set to 2.6
[Mankiw and Summers (1986), Lucas(1988), Chari et al. (2000)]. For real balances, ϑ is set so that
31See Table B.1, B.2 and B.3 for the model calibration
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the velocity in the deterministic steady state, defined as cP/M corresponds to a value of 2.4 as in
Davig and Leeper (2006). The price elasticity of demand ε and the Rotemberg adjustment cost
coefficient ψ are set to 6 and 100 respectively as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Ireland
(2004) respectively. The parameter value of price elasticity of demand means firms markup the
prices of their goods over marginal cost by 20 percent.
The parameters governing monetary and fiscal rules are calibrated in a standard way. Par-
ticularly, the interest rate smoothing parameter ρR is set to 0.75 while ρπ and ρY are set to 1.5
and 0.6 respectively. Adaptin a passive tax policy rule, the coefficients in the fiscal rule are set
to ψb = ψbl = 0.15. The autoregressive coefficients and standard deviations of the shocks in the
model are set to φG = ρbL = 0.9 while σR = 0.005 and σG = 0.012 [Kim (2000), Andés et al.
(2004), Altig et al. (2011), Falagiarda and Marzo (2012) and Zagaglia (2013)]. There is one free
parameter which is the portfolio adjustment friction φL ∈ [0.005, 0.1] which falls between values
of Andés et al (2004), Chen et al. (2012) and Falagiarda (2014). It is set to a value of 0.01 in
the baseline case . Sensitivity analysis is conducted by perturbing the parameter to analyse its
impact on the economy.
Appendix 1.B derives the model implied parameters and steady state values see. Table B.3
reports the steady states values of bond holdings by households, foreign official institutions and
total bond demand. The steady state values were computed from Betaut-Tyron measures of
benchmark consistent positions. The steady-state total of debt to output ratio is 28 percent and
this corresponds to a steady-state tax output ratio of 19.5 percent.32
The steady-state value for the share of foreign official holding of long term bonds xt can be
pinned down by equations (15), x = BFL /BL. The persistence parameter, ρx that governs the
AR(1) process for the share of FOHL in outstanding debt (xt) is set to 0.72 and the corresponding
standard deviation is σx is set to 1.53.
33 Sensitivity analysis is conducted on ρx by setting it to
high and low values away from the baseline value of 0.72.
32The steady debt to output ratio is a little lower than the usual 33 percent value. This is because the analysis
abstracts away from the Feds holdings of debt. This does not change the main results of the model
33An ARCH-in-Mean estimation is carried out for the AR(1) equation of xt to obtain the baseline parameter
values for ρx and σx.
23
1.5.2 Impact of foreign official holding shock
To examine the impact of shocks to foreign official holdings, figure 1.4 shows the equilibrium
models impulse responses following a positive shock to foreign official purchases of long-term U.S
Treasuries (i.e. a shock to xt). An average positive shock of σx = 1.53 to long-term bond holdings
by foreign officials reduces the relative supply of long-term bond supply and hence the amount
of long-term bonds available to households. Through the stock effect channel shown in equation
(2.13), the reduction of relative supply of long-term bonds available to households then reduces
the long-term yield by an average of 13 basis points on impact. The shocks’ negative impact on
long-term interest rate is consistent with results found in the empirical literature (See for instance,
Warnock and Warnock (2009), Bernanke et al. (2004), Beltran et al. (2013), Kaminska and Zinna
(2014)).34
The effect of a on the macroeconomy occurs via the feedback mechanism from the endogenous
term structure generated by the model. Through the feedback mechanism shown in equation
(1.14), the fall in long-term interest rate creates favorable economic conditions that stimulates
consumption. Consequently, through the resource constraint, output increases which in turn
increases inflation via equilibrium forces. Monetary policy responds to the increase in output and
inflation by increasing the short term rate (Rt). Finally, the decoupling of long-term rates from
short-term rate reduces the term spread defined as long-term rate minus short-term rate. The
simultaneous rise in short-term interest rate, fall in long-term interest rate, and fall in the term
spread is consistent with the “Greenspan Conundrum”, i.e. the decoupling of long-term interest
rates from short term interest rates between 2004 to 2006.
It is important to conduct sensitivity analysis to gain insight of the principal mechanisms at
work. Specifically, low and high parameter values are assigned to the parameter governing: (i) the
persistence of FOHL shock, ρx and (ii) portfolio adjustment cost, φL. The dynamics of the model
following the variations of these parameters is then compared to the baseline model. Furthermore,
34The quantitative impact of FOHL shock on long-term rates in the model is compared to selected empirical
studies in Section 4.
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the impact of FOHL shock on the term-premium is discussed in the sensitivity analysis.35 The
results from the sensitivity anaylsis is discussed in below.
1.5.3 Role of Persistence of Foreign Official Holding Shock, ρx
To investigate the role of the persistence of the FOHL shock, sensitivity analysis for the parameter
governing the AR(1) process for the share of FOHL, ρx is carried out. The parameter is set to a
low and high value away from the baseline value of 0.72. The corresponding low and high value
for ρx are 0.52 and 0.83 respectively.
Figure 1.5 plots the impulse response functions when varying ρx to examine the role of the
persistence of FOHL shock. The solid blue line is the baseline case, the dotted red line is the
low persistence case and the dashed black line is the high persistence case. The mechanisms at
work is the same as explained in the baseline case. However, on impact, a higher persistence
value associated with FOHL shock (black dashed line) increases consumption, output, and hence
inflation higher than the baseline case. This causes the monetary authority to raise the short-term
rates more aggressively, which in turn offsets the negative effect of the shock on long-term interest
rate.
This offsetting effect makes it appear that the FOHL shock has little or no impact on the
nominal long-term interest rate when it hits. This outcome is in line with results in Rudesbusch
et al. (2006) who find an insignificant effect of foreign official purchases on the long-term interest
rate. It is important to note that long-term rates do not respond one-to-one to the aggressive
increase in the short-term rates since it takes longer for demand of long-term bonds to return to
its steady state– a persistent stock effect. Consequently, there is a persistent delay in the term-
spread to return to its steady after it falls. This effect feeds back into the economy inducing higher
peak values for consumption, output and inflation relative to baseline case. The opposite effect
holds for the case of low low persistence value of ρx (blue line).
35The term premium is computed as the deviation of the long-term interest rates from its expectation hypothesis









t is the yield of a k− period zero-coupon bond
at time t proxied by constant maturity bond in the model; R1t = Rt and k = 10 in the model.
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1.5.4 Role of Portfolio Adjustment Costs, φL
To examine the role of portfolio adjustment cost which reflects the degree of imperfect asset substi-
tutability between short and long-term bonds, the parameter value governing portfolio adjustment
costs φL is varied according to low substitutability (dotted red line, φL =0.005) and high substi-
tutability(dashed green line, φL =0.02) values. These variations in φL are then compared to the
baseline case (solid blue line with φL =0.01). Notice that in the absence of portfolio adjustment
costs (φL = 0 when short and long term bonds are perfect substitutes), reductions in relative sup-
plies of the two bonds have no impact the interest rates and hence the economy. In this scenario,
the stock effect is non-existent.
Figure 1.6 plots the impulse response functions when varying the parameter that governs
imperfect asset substitution, φL. Given an equal fall in long-term bond supply available to house-
holds following a positive shock to FOHL, a higher imperfect asset substitutability generates higher
stock effect relative to the baseline value of portfolio adjustment cost. Specifically, in the case of
higher portfolio adjustment cost (the dashed black line), the term spread falls more compared to
the low and baseline cases of the portfolio adjustment cost which is given by the dotted red line
and solid blue line respectively. Again, through the feedback mechanism from the endogenous
term structure explained in equation (2.14), the peak effect of consumption, output and inflation
are higher in the case of high portfolio adjustment costs due to a more severe fall in the term
spread. The opposite holds in the case of low portfolio adjustment costs (dashed blue line).
1.5.5 Model’s Effect on Long-Term Interest Rate Compared to Other Studies
While investigating the macroeconomic implications of FOHL shock in the model, the long-term
interest rate served as the key link connecting the dots on how FOHL affects the economy. Con-
sequently, the paper directly studies the effect of FOHL on the long-term interest rate through
the stock effect channel in the context of a DSGE model with portfolio adjustment costs. The
methodology employed in this paper is fundamentally different from those in the existing litera-
ture that use a broad spectrum of fully-fledged empirical models to study the impact of FOHL
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on the long-term interest rates. It is therefore necessary–after acknowledging all conceptual and
methodological differences– to compare how well the model performs quantitatively on the impact
of FOHL on the long-term rate to other studies.36
Table B.4 compares the quantitative effect of FOHL on the long-term interest rate and the
term spread implied by the model to selected empirical studies. Overall, on impact, the model
implied quantitative effect of FOHL on the long-term interest rate (level)–with the maximum and
minimum effect of -22 and 0 basis points respectively– is rather low compared to the values from
the selected studies. This disparity as explained earlier are due to methodological and conceptual
issues which can include the choice of approximation technique selected to numerically solve the
model.37 Notice however that the zero impact effect of the shock on long-term interest rate is
consistent with the no effect found in Rudesbusch et al. (2006).
The model implied effect of FOHL on the term premium is however comparable to the em-
pirical studies. Particularly, on impact, the shock’s effect on the term premium ranges from -34
to -54 basis points which compares to a similar result, -46 to -50 basis points– found in Beltran
et. al (2013) and -51 as in Kohn (2015). Lastly, the stock effect of FOHL in the model is -26 basis
points, a value -6 higher than the result in Beltran et al. (2013) and -11 basis point higher than
stock effect in Bertaut et al. (2011).38
1.6 The Model’s Empirical Implication
The goal of this section is to assess to empirical implications of the DSGE model explained above.
An important feature of the modelled economy in section 4 is the fact that, FOHL shock impacts
the economy through the endogenous term structure of interest rate, in this case captured through
36A caveat to this comparison is that different methodologies, measures of foreign official holdings (e.g.6-month,
12-month flow measure) or the frequency of the data employed to study the effect of FOHL on the long-term interest
rate are likely to lead to very different results. This point is well-emphasized in Beltran et al.(2013). They note
that differences in their estimates compared to those from large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) can be attributed
to conceptual and methodological issues. I take an agnostic stands on these issues by acknowledging these caveats
and compare my results to other studies.
37Table B.5 compares model generated moments to the empirical moments from data.
38The stock effect (SEx) is computed as the impact effect Iσx divided by one minus the persistence of FOHL









the term-spread. Moreover, FOHL do not respond to any asset price or any macroeconomic
variable. Therefore to assess the empirical implications of the DSGE model, these key features
from the model are incorporated into a five variable structural near-VAR model. The effects of
FOHL shock on the variables included in the near-VAR are then studied through impulse response
functions from the near-VAR. Specifically, the paper does a Monte Carlo integration analysis of a
combination of a near-VAR for the lag coefficients and a structural VAR for the covariance matrix.
1.6.1 The near-VAR model
Based on assumptions and implications of the DSGE model discussed above, quarterly data from
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The estimated model is partitioned into two blocks. The first block includes the following four
variables40: the cyclical component of real gross domestic product, yt, which is obtained by ap-
plying the Hodrick-Prescott filter; the rate of inflation, πt, computed from the GDP deflator; the
effective Federal Funds rate, Rt; the term spread, spdt, computed as the 10-year interest rate
minus the 3-month interest rate. The second block includes one variable, the 3-month average of
3-month flow measure of FOHL, xt.
41 As in the DSGE model, the feedback mechanism from the
39The start date for the data is due to data availability and the end data is to avoid the nonlinearities posed by
Zero Lower Bound and Quantitative Easing after the global financial crisis in 2008.
40This specification is standard in the structural vectorautoregression literature. See Marzo et al. (2008) for
further discussion. In Marzo et al. (2008) the term structure is captured by including the 1-year, 5-year and
10-year interest rate. I instead summarize the term structure by including the term spread. This is discussed more
in the idenfication section.
41The data on real GDP, GDP deflator, Federal Funds rate, 10-year and 3-month interest rate were obtained from
the FRED database available at: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Data concerning foreign official holding
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term structure to the economy is capture by including the lag terms of the term spread in the
output and inflation equation. Furthermore, the lags of FOHL, (xt) is included in all the other
equations, however, since FOHL does not respond to any macroeconomic variable, zero restric-
tions are placed on all the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables in the FOHL equation of
the near-VAR model.
Due to the zero restrictions on the lag variables in the last equation, a Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) is employed to estimate the system in (2.26). One can obtain consistent estima-
tors from using OLS in the presence of a near-VAR, however, as explained in Zellner (1962) there
are potential efficiency gains in using SUR. As far as the lag length selection goes, the Shwartz
Information Criteria suggests one lag for the estimated VARs.
1.6.2 Identification
To summarize the identification strategy, let et denote the 5× 1 vector that collects the reduced
form near-VAR residuals (eit) and let εt denote the 5× 1 vector that collects the strutural shocks
(εit) for i = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The structural shocks are therefore related to the reduced form residuals
through the following equations:
ε1t = e1t (1.26)
ε2t + b21ε1t = e2t (1.27)
ε3t + b32ε2t + b31ε1t = e3t (1.28)
ε4t + b43ε3t + b42ε2t + b41ε1t + b45ε5t = e4t (1.29)
ε5t = e5t (1.30)
Equation (2.27) - (1.30) can be written compactly as:
of long-term U.S. Treasuries was obtained from the Bertaut-Tyron dataset available at:http://www.federalreserve.
gov/Pubs/ifdp/2007/910/default.htm.
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Bεt = et, where B =

1 0 0 0 0
b21 1 0 0 0
b31 b32 1 0 0
b41 b42 b43 1 b45
0 0 0 0 1

(1.31)
The explanation for the ordering of the shocks in the B matrix reveals a combination of two
identification strategies:
1. The first block, equations (2.27) – (1.29) is ordered such that, inflation only responds to out-
put shock, the policy rate shock responds contemparoneously to output and inflation while
the term spread which is given by long-term rate minus the short-term rate respond to out-
put, inflation and the monetary policy rate shocks. Specifically, the shocks (ε1t, ε2t, ε3t, ε4t)
are ordered in a Choleski fashion which is consistent in the literature. In addition, the term
spread shock responds to FOHL shock, in a way capturing the stock effect channel. In es-
sense the term spread shock is is impacted by all the shock variables in the VAR model.
This is representative of the DSGE model discussed in section 4.42
2. The second is a single equation, equation (1.30) which describes the exogeneity of FOHL
assumed in the DSGE model and imposes the restriction that the FOHL shock is not cor-
related to any other shock in the model. Hence, zero restrictions are imposed on all the
coefficients of the other shocks as shown in the last row of B.
As mentioned earlier, with the assumption that FOHL is invariant to the other shocks in the near-
VAR, the structural covariance system in equation (2.27)-(1.30) is overidentified. Hence to obtain
the impulse response functions with their corresponding confidence intervals, the paper employs a
Monte Carlo integration and Gibbs sampling for the overidentified structural covariance model.43
42In particular, see equation 2.13.
43The Gibbs sampler is a particular technique recently adopted to tackle instances in where it is impossible
to make direct draws based on random Normals (See Doan (2010)). The MONTENEARSVAR.RPF provides an
example for the implementation of MCMC analysis of a combination of a near VAR for the lag coefficients and a
structural VAR for the covariance matrix.
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1.6.3 Impulse Response Functions from near-VAR
To analyse the effects of FOHL shock on the variables in the near-VAR model, the impulse response
functions which traces out the path of the variables in periods t = 0, 1, 2, ... in response to FOHL
are considered. Specifically, median responses are reported alongside the error bands in response
to a one time structural disturbance in period t = 0 to FOHL. In light of Sims and Zha (1999),
the 16th and 84th percentiles are reported for the confidence bands.
Figure 1.8 shows that in response to a shock to FOHL, the term spread declines. Note that,
the term spread comprises two components, the expectation components and the term-premium
component.44 With the identification strategy for restrictions on the lag coefficients and the
structural shocks in the system of equations in (2.26) and (1.31), it is reasonable to infer that
the first few quarters that the term spread declines can be attributed to fall in the term-premium
component. This gradual decline in the term spread feeds back into the economy and in turn
increases real output. This result is consistent with the predictions from the DSGE model as well
as Rudesbush et al. (2007) who finds that falls in the term premium is usually associated with
stimulus to real economic activity.
As output rises, inflation also increases. The monetary authority respond to the increase in
inflation and output by raising policy rates. However, even with the increase in policy rates, the
term spread assumes only a slight upward trajectory and still remains negative. This highlight
an interest rate conundrum similar to the case in the DSGE model explained above. Specifically,
this implicitly reveals that the long-term interest rate is not purely determined by the current
and future path of short-term interest rate, hence breaking down the Expectation Hypothesis
Theorem.
In summary, the results from the impulse response functions generated from the near-VAR
above provide empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that shocks to FOHL have expan-
sionary macroeconomic effects on the U.S economy. This complements the core findings from the
DSGE model in section 3.
44For a comprehensive treatment of decomposition of the term spread see Rosenberg and Maurer (2008).
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the macroeconomic implications of FOHL on key economic variables
including consumption, output and inflation through its impact on the long-term interest rate.
Employing a DSGE model that treats short and long-term bonds as imperfect subsititutes through
portfolio adjustment costs, the paper finds that shocks to FOHL have expansionary macroeconomic
effects on the U.S economy – FOHL shocks increase consumption, output and inflation. This result
is complemented by empirical impulse response from a structural near-VAR model.
Although the primary contribution of this paper is to study the macroeconomic implications
of FOHL shocks in a DSGE model, the core results help draw the following broad conclusions and
policy implication:
1. The results show that it is näıve to discount the macroeconomic effects of the actions of
major holders of U.S debt such as foreign official agents. In the context of this paper, these
effects are expansionary– FOHL shocks increase consumption, output and inflation. This
result is captured through the negative stock effect channel of FOHL shocks on the long-
term interest rate which feeds back in an expansionary fashion into the economy from the
endogenous term-structure. Both the stock effect and feedback from the endogenous term-
structure are generated by the introduction of portfolio adjustment cost. This emphasizes
the fact that unlike previous studies that focus on quantifying the impact of FOHL on the
long-term interest rate, it important to extend studies to understand the macroeconomic
implications FOHL shocks.
2. The characteristics of privates agents and foreign official institutions are crucial to under-
standing the degree of the impact of FOHL on the macro economy. For instance, given the
mechanisms at work in the model–stock effect channel and feedback mechanism from the en-
dogenous term structure– if households do not treat short and long-term bonds as imperfect
substitutes, the model shows that FOHL will have no impact on the economy. Meanwhile,
with some degree of imperfect asset substitutability, a high (low) degree of persistence of
FOHL shocks can lead to a high (moderate) expansionary maroeconomic effects. Moreover,
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a low persistence of FOHL shows that on impact, shock to FOHL can have a decently large
and negative effect on the long-term interest rate while a high persistence has no effect. This
result contributes to the literature by unifying the mixed results in the existing literature.
3. Lastly, since the monetary authority responds to inflation and output in the model, short-
term interest rate increases due to the expansionary effect of FOHL shock. However, FOHL
shocks have a negative effect on long-term interest rates and hence there is a simultaneous
fall in long-term interest rates and increase in short-term interest rate. This causes the
term spread to fall similar to the Conundrum experienced between 2004-2006. This last
results prompts attention to the fact that monetary policy must somehow acknowledge the
actions of foreign official agents when making policy decisions as their actions can generate
unpleasant macro-implications.
This paper may be extended in at least two ways. First, by examining the role of FOHL in
the face of the Quantitative Easing at the Zero Lower Bound of interest rates. Second, by treating
FOHL as an endogenous variable where FOHL respond to changes in the bond prices and other
macro-factors. In the first case, following the global financial crisis in 2008, policy rates have
been constrained at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) in the U.S until recently. Unprecedented large
asset purchases by the Federal Reserve (i.e. Quantitative Easing) was employed as unconventional
monetary policy tool at the ZLB to help stimulate the economy. It will be equally important to
study the separate role of FOHL at the ZLB in the presence of Quantitative Easing. This will
complement studies such as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003); Gertler and Karadi (2011); and
Falagiarda (2014). In the second case, although this paper treats FOHL as an exogenous variable
and is able to study their implications on the macroeconomy, an important extension will be to
examine this same question but in the context of endogenous FOHL. This will be in line with
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Calibration of baseline values for ρx and σx
An Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic ARCH(1)-in-mean model is used in estimating
the parameters of the process for the share of foreign official holdings of long-term U.S Treasuries.
The parameters ρx and the standard σx are estimated as follows:





where foiL,t is 3-month foreign official inflows of long term bonds official inflows computed
from Bertaut-Tyron measures of foreign official holdings. The error term εxt is modelled such that
it follows an ARCH(1) process:
(εxt )





2 + υxt (1.2A)
Table 1. below reports the estimation results.
Table A.1: Estimation results : ARCH-in-mean
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)













Appendix 1.B: The Steady-State and Implied Parameters
Steady state values of the economic variables in the model are defined such that, for any time
period t, Xt = Xt+1 = X. Hence, at steady-state, the variable Xt is time invariant so the time
subscripts are dropped. Below are the equations defining steadystate values of the economic vari-
ables that have closed form solutions.
FOC Consumption:
λ = (C − θC)γ(1− βθ) (1.1B)
























































Appendix 1.C: Full Log-Linearized Model
The dynamic economic problem presented in the paper takes on a system of non-linear difference
equations. Since there are no closed form solutions, I employ a first order Taylor expansion
to approximate the nonlinear model around the neighborhood of its steady-state and solve it
numerically. Particularly, for a smooth arbitrary function h(xt), the function is approximated
linearly as:
h(xt) = h(x) + h
′(x)(xt − x)
Below is the full log linearized model:
FOC Consumption:
(βθγ(Cc̃t+1 − θCc̃t)− γ(Cc̃t − θCc̃t−1))(C − θC)−γ−1 = λλ̃t (1.1C)














w̃t = ϕñt − λ̃t (1.3C)











(b̃ht − b̃hL,t) (1.4C)













































π̃t + Y ỹt − Cc̃t (1.6C)
Production Technology:
ỹt = ñt (1.7C)
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Supply of Long-term bonds available to households:
bhLb̃
h
























(b̃t−1 − π̃) + ζ1
bL
Rπ̃
(b̃L,t−1 − π̃t) (1.12C)
Firm Pricing:




AR(1) process for share of FOHL:
x̃F,t = ρxx̃F,t−1 + ε
x
t (1.14C)
AR(1) process for Long-Term Bond Supply:
b̃L,t = ρbLb̃L,t−1 + ε
l
t (1.16D)
AR(1) process for Government Spending:




Table B.1: Calibrated steady-state values of some variables
Description Notation Value
Output Y 1.00
Taxes-output ratio T/Y 0.195
Labor hours N 1/3
Gross short-term rate, Annual R 1.04
Steady-state inflation rate π 1
Table B.2: Baseline Parameter calibration
Description Notation Value
Discount factor β 0.995
Habit formation θ 0.7
Coefficient of risk aversion γ 1.0
Elasticity of money demand η 2.6
Inverse of elasticity of labor supply ϕ 1
Elasticity of Demand ε 6.0
Cost of Price Adjustment ψ 100
Portfolio adjustment friction φL 0.01
Monetary policy
Monetary policy response to output ρY 0.6
Monetary policy response to inflation ρπ 1.5
Monetary policy inertia ρR 0.85
Taxation policy
Steady-state Lump Sum Tax ζ0 0.195
Tax response to short-term bonds ζ1 0.15
Tax response to short-term bonds ζ2 0.15
Autogressive Coefficients
Monetary Policy φφR 0.85
Government spending φG 0.90
LT bonds shock ρbL 0.90
Standard Deviations
Monetary Policy Shock St. Dev. σR 0.0025
Government Spending Shock St. Dev. σG 0.012
LT bonds Shock St. Dev. σL 0.01
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Table B.3: Calibration of Key Parameter and Steady State Values
Description Notation Value
Total LT bonds Outstanding per GDP BL,t 0.220
Total ST bonds Outstanding per GDP Bt 0.056
LT bonds held by households per GDP BHL,t 0.151
LT bonds held by FOH per GDP BFL,t 0.068
Share of FOH LT bonds(xt) shock Coef. ρx 0.72
Magnitude of FOHL shock σx 1.53
Table B.4: Comparison of Model Results to Empirical Estimates of Foreign Official Purchases on Long Term Yield
Studies On Impact Methodology
My Model: Long-term Interest Rate No Effect to -22 bps Calibrated DSGE model
My Model: Term Premium -34 to -54 bps Calibrated DSGE model
Kohn (2015) -51 bps CBAPM (Term Premium)
Rudesbusch et. al (2006) No Effect ANM-F model
Beltran et al. (2013) -39 to -62 bps Excess returns regression
Beltran et al. (2013) -46 to -50 bps Term premium regression
Warnock & Warnock (2009) -68 bps OLS regression
Stock Effect (Max. Effect)
My Model -26 bps Calibrated DSGE model
Beltran et al. (2013) -20 bps Cointegration (Holdings(level))
Bertaut et al. (2011) -15 bps Regressions (Holdings(level))
Source: Beltran et al. (2013) and author’s computation/compilation
Notes: Consumption Based Asset Pricing Model (CBAPM); Affine no-arbitrage macro-finance (ANM-F)
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Table B.5: Moment Comparison
Std. Dev. of variable Data Model Model Model
(φL = 0.005) (φL = 0.01) (φL = 0.02)
Macro-variables
Output 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.44
Consumption 0.72 0.10 0.10 0.11
Inflation 0.32 0.62 0.91 1.10
Financial variables
Short-term interest rate 0.30 0.50 0.67 0.81
Long-term interest rate 0.12 0.47 0.59 0.71
Term-Spread 0.59 0.32 0.36 0.40
The table compares empirical moments from data and theoretical moments implied by the model. The data is
treated similar to the variable in the model and it is filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of λ = 1600. All values are in percent with the exception of the term spread. Theoretical moments from
the model with low habits (θ < 0.7) show similar results to baseline model but with a much higher volatility in
consumption. Similar results hold for the FOHL persistence parameter (ρx).
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1990q1 1994q3 1999q1 2003q3 2008q1
qdate
1−Year Yield 10−Year Yield
Spread
Source: FRED and author’s calculation.
Note: The Spread is computed as the 10-year yield minus the 1-year yield
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1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
Date
FOHL FEDLH
Source: Author’s illustration of Bertaut-Tyron Measure of Foreign Official Holdings and
FRED
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Figure 1.3: Shares of Short and Long Term Foreign Official Bond Holdings in Total Foreign Official Holding,
January 1990 to June 2011
30%
70%
Short Term Long Term
Source: Author’s illustration of Bertaut-Tyron Measure of Foreign Official Holding (Long-term bond holdings)
and Treasury International Capital System (TIC), section A.2 (Short-term bond Holding).
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Household ST bond holding
Quarters






Household LT bond holding
Figure 1.4: Selected impulse response functions from the equilibrium model following a shock to the share of long
term bond holdings of foreign official Institutions (xt)
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Household ST bond holding
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Household LT bond holding
ρ
x
 = 0.83 (High)
ρ
x
 = 0.72 (Baseline)
ρ
x
 = 0.52 (Low)
Figure 1.5: Selected impulse responses to a shock to the share of long term bond holdings of foreign official
Institutions (xt) when varying the persistence parameter ρx. The black dashed line represents high persistence,
the dotted red line represents low persistence and the solid blue line represents the baseline case.
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Figure 1.6: Selected impulse responses to a shock to the share of long-term bond holdings of foreign official
Institutions (xt) when varying the portfolio adjustment cost parameter φL. The black dashed line represents high
portfolio adjustment costs, the dotted red line represents low portfolio adjustment costs and the solid blue line
represents the baseline case.
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=0.005 (Low Adj. Cost)





























Figure 1.7: The figure shows the impulse responses of the Term Premium to a positive shock to the share of
long-term bond holdings of U.S Treasuries by foreign officials. The top figure depicts the baseline case; the middle
figure show the response of the Term Premium when varying the persistence parameter for the AR(1) process for
xt, (ρx) while the bottom figure shows the response of the Term Premium when varying the portfolio adjustment
cost parameter, φL. The thick blue line represents the baseline model.The circled black line and red plus lines
represent high and low parameter values respectively.
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Figure 1.8: Median impulse response functions for the term spread, output, inflation and Fedfunds rate are reported
following a shock to foreign official holdings of long-term U.S. Treasuries. The corresponding confidence bounds
are defined at 68% posterior bands.
Responses to Foreign Official Holding
Term Spread








































Graphical Appendix: Sensitivity analysis on monetary policy inertia and habit parameter.











































Model w/ Policy Inertia, ρ
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Model w/o Policy Inertia, ρ
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 = 0









































Figure 1.9: Effect of monetary policy inertia, ρR, following FOHL shock.















































































Figure 1.10: Effect of habits, θ, following FOHL shock.
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Chapter 2
On Foreign Aid Fungibility and Aid
Effectiveness: The Role of Consumer
Preferences over Government Spending
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Abstract
A persistent concern raised by policymakers and donors on foreign aid effectiveness is fungibility– the
possibility that aid finances government spending in the recipient country in ways not intended by donors
when disbursing the funds. In this chapter, we advance the study of aid fungibility by examining how the
intra-temporal relationship between private and government consumption interact with fungible aid to
impact aid effectiveness. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of substitutability/complementarity
between private and government consumption in aid dependent countries. We then incorporate this
feature into a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model and show that the way consumers internalize
an aid-induced government spending due to fungibility can have constrasting impacts on aid effectiveness.
Three key findings emerge from analytical and numerical results: (1) when government spending is a
complement or weak substitute to private consumption, inflow of fungible aid results in expansionary
macroeconomic effects. These expansionary effects are stronger when the two goods are complements;
(2) when government spending is a strong substitutes to private consumption, fungible aid has negative
aggregate effects; (3) weak public institutional factors such as corruption and inefficient bureaucracy
offsets the positive effects in (1) and mitigates the negative effects of fungible aid in (2). Our findings
provide a new and additional channel that policymakers can exploit to improve aid effectiveness even
when it is fungible.
JEL: D73, E02, F35, F40, O55




A persistent concern raised by policymakers and donors on foreign aid effectiveness is fungibility–
the possibility that aid is used in ways not intended by donors when disbursing the funds.1 In
a traditional sense, fungible aid can be rationalized as a situation where there is no “actual”
diversion of aid funds, but instead, aid funds an activity that would have happened in the absence
of aid. This in turn frees up resources to be used elsewhere in the economy.2 In this sense, the
actual effect of aid is directly tied to the “freed” up government funds which is ultimately spent
in the recipient country.
In a “perfect world”, the increase in government spending due to foreign aid fungibility should
not be a problem, because, at the very least, government spending contributes an immediate dollar
to aggregate demand.3 However, even in this loose scenario, classic macroeconomic problems such
as crowding out of private consumption are always of concern. Moreover, as argued by Bailey
(1971) the effectiveness of an increase in government spending crucially depends on the degree
of substitutability between private and government consumption.4 This implies that, when aid
is fungible the relationship between private and government consumption directly impacts the
aggregate effects of aid.
Recently, Morrisey (2015) finds that the extent to which aid is fungible is over-stated and
even where evidence exists that aid is fungible, it does not appear to diminish the effectiveness
of aid but adds that these conclusion are country-specific. Similarly, a number of studies have
argued that fungibility is not necessarily a bad thing nor something donors need to be particularly
concerned about with regard to aid effectiveness (Hauck et al. (2005); Rothmann and ten Have
(2004); Pettersson (2007); McGillivray and Morrissey (2000); McGillivray and Morrissey (2004);
Morrissey (2006);Wagstaff (2011)). These studies in turn propose that in countries where there are
sound policies, appropriate allocations of expenditure, and effective services, donors can provide
1Ample evidence of aid being fungible exists (See for instance Marć (2015); Van de Sijpe (2012); Chatterjee et.
al (2012); Outtara (2006); Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and Zampelli (1986))
2Singer (1965), Hjertholm et al. (2000) and more recently Leiderer (2012) discuss into detail the issue of foreign
aid fungibility
3This can be verified directly from the resource constraint, i.e. Yt = Ct +Gt + It +Xt −Mt.
4See Barro (1981) and Bailey (1971) for a deeper discussion.
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large amounts of assistance as general budget support, knowing that the resources will be well
used.5
These studies, however, preclude the subtle but important relationship between private and
government consumption from their evaluation of aid effectiveness when aid is fungible. In this
paper we focus on the issue of foreign aid fungibility and study how the intra-temporal relation-
ship between private consumption (C) and public/government consumption (G) plays a role in
impacting the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid– a phenomenon absent in both the empirical
and theoterical literature of foreign aid fungibility.6
A probing question that remain is, why is the relationship between private and government
consumption relevant in understanding the macroeconomic effects of fungible aid? The following
examples might help set this discussion in perspective. Consider major components of government
spending in developing countries such as education, defense, and health expenditure. Increases
in spending for these components can produce some externalities either, positive or negative, for
private consumption. For instance, massive provision of public health services can reduce the need
for private hospitals. Similarly, an increase in public schools can reduce the demand for private
schools. Thus public health services and public schools substitutes for private health services and
private schools respectively.
Meanwhile, education can serve as a complement for other components of private consump-
tion. For instance, better educated people can contribute to an increase in the demand for intellec-
tual books, or demand healthier foods.7 These possible relationships between private consumption
and different items of public spending makes government consumption, on aggregate, to be either
a substitute or complement for private consumption.
Consequently, the type of relationship between private and public consumption, either as a
complements or substitutes, can lead to nontrivial effects of government spending induced by inflow
of fungible aid thereby impacting aid effectiveness. This substitution/complementarity channel
5See also Leiderer (2012)
6In this paper we will interchange public spending with government spending often.
7Additionally, other composition of government spending for public order can reduce the need for a private
policeman, while subsidies for purchasing computers can increase private expenditures for internet services and so
on. Ercolani(2007) elaborates more on this and offers several examples of useful government spending.
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between private and public consumption and its interaction with fungible aid remains a gap in
the aid effectiveness literature.
We contribute and advance the literature on aid fungibility and aid effectiveness in the fol-
lowing ways. First, we take the country-specific approach and provide emipirical evidence of
substitutability/complementarity between government and private consumption by estimating a
structural cointegration regression for three top aid-recipient economies– Egypt, Kenya, and Nige-
ria.8 The results from the estimation suggest that, for the full sample, government consumption
is complementary to private consumption in Egypt, a weak substitute to private consumption in
Nigeria and wasteful in Kenya. However, for the estimates from sub-samples periods, we find
that government and private consumption are strong substitutes in Nigeria but weak substitutes
in Kenya. In contrast, there is no observed relationship between the two goods in Egypt. The
results from our estimations imply that government spending on aggregate, is useful and utility
enhancing in aid-receipient countries.
Second, with motivation from the empirical results, we develop a dynamic general equilib-
rium model that captures the existence of substitutability/complementarity between government
and private consumption to explicitly study their role in impacting the macroeconomic effects
of fungible aid. Additionally, we study the impact of institutional quality measured through
accountability, transparency, and corruption in the public sector in our modelled economy.
In the model, complementarity/substitutability between public and private consumption is
achieved by modeling a household agent who internalizes government spending as useful and
gains direct utility from government spending. The complete model consists of a representative
household agent; a benevolent foreign agent who disburses aid to support the general budget of
the recipient country; a productive sector with intermediate and final goods firms and finally a
government sector that conducts both monetary and fiscal policy.9 In the model, foreign aid fungi-
bility is captured in the fiscal policy block through a less than one-for-one increase in government
spending following an inflow of foreign aid. We therefore evaluate the effect of fungible aid by
8We discuss our choice of countries in Section 2.2.
9Leiderer (2012) and Koeberle et al. (2006) discuss into detail government budget support as an effective aid
modality.
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studying the effectiveness of the marginal increase in government spending given the degree of
complementarity/substitutability between private and public consumption.
After log-linearizing and calibrating the model in a standard way, three key findings emerge
from our analytical and numerical results10:
1. when government spending is a complement or weak substitute to private consumption, the
marginal increase in government spending following a dollar inflow of fungible aid results
in expansionary macroeconomic effects–increasing output growth of the recipient country.
These expansionary effects are stronger when private and government consumption are com-
plements;
2. in the case where government spending is a strong substitutes to private consumption, the
additional rise in government spending due to an inflow in fungible aid generates contrac-
tionary macroeconomic effects in the recipient country’s economy;
3. when we control for quality of institutions in the recipient country, we find that weak public
institutional factors such as high corruption and inefficient bureaucracy reduces the positive
effect of foreign aid in (1) and offsets the negative effects of foreign aid in (2). They however,
do not change the impact of aid.
These results strongly suggest that, with fungibility in play, omitting a prior the substitutability
or complementarity channel between private and government consumption when evaluating the
macroeconomic effects of aid can bias the impact of aid. This conclusion is robust when we
control for quality of institutions in the model. Policywise, the link between private consumption
and government spending provides policymakers and donors alike an additional avenue that they
can explore to tailor strategic policies that can greatly improve aid effectiveness even when it is
fungible.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an empirical evidence of
substitutability/complementarity between private and public consumption; Section 2.3 describe
the theoretical model with useful government spending and fungible aid; Section 2.4 discusses the
analytical and numerical results from the model. Section 2.5 concludes.
10We show that the analytical results hold with heterogenuous households.
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2.2 Empirical Evidence of Useful ‘G’ in Aid Dependent Countries
In this section we provide evidence of the degree of substitutability/complementarity between
private consumption and government spending. As discussed earlier, when foreign aid is fungible,
its macroeconomic effects in the recipient country’s economy depends critically on how government
spending impacts the economy. Hence, investigating the usefulness of government spending and
its relationship with private consumption in the long-run becomes central to understanding and
evaluating the macroeconomic effects of fungible foreign aid.
We select three countries–Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria– from the list of top aid receiving
countries to provide evidence of substitutability/complementarity between government and private
consumption.11 These countries were selected primarily due to data availability.12
For our empirical analyses, we employ annual data for 1960 to 2015 from the World Devel-
opment Indicators (World Bank (2016)) to estimate the reduced form estimation equation given
in Eq.(2.1):
ln(Ct/Gt) = α + β ln(P
g/P c) + et (2.1)
Since the focus is on the long-term relationship between private and government consumption,
Eq.(2.1) represents a cointegration regression that relates the logarithm of private and govern-
ment consumption ratio, ln(Ct/Gt), to their corresponding logarithm price ratio, ln(P
g/P c). The
gradient parameter β governs the elasticity of substitution between household and government
consumption. Negative values of β represent complementarity between private and government
consumption while a positive value means the two goods are substitutes. When β is not different
from zero, then government spending is non-useful or wasteful.
11Countries that rank in the top ten aid receiving countries using 3-year average (2012 - 2014) include, in
descending order: Afghanistan; Vietnam; Egypt, Ethiopia; Syrian Arab Republic; Turkey; Tanzania; Kenya; DRC
Congo; and Pakistan. Nigeria ranks 6th in the top 10 ODA receipts by recipient in Africa as of 2013.
12Alternatively, we can instead investigate the usefulness (complementarity/substitutability) of government
spending by using panel data to expand our dataset. However, estimates obtained from the panel data pro-
vide global or regional information instead of country specific information which is more relevant from a policy
perpective. Addison and Tarp (2015) for instance emphasize the need to carry out country-specific analyses in
studying aid effectiveness.
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Eq.(2.1) is a reduced form specification and do not have any structural interpretations. To
lend structural interpretation to Eq.(2.1), we follow Kwan (2007), Ogaki and Park (1997), Ogaki
and Reinhart (1992), and Ogaki (1992) and assume a representative consumer who gains utility
from two goods, private and public. The agents expected lifetime utility function is governed by





where the effective consumption, Ce is given as
Ce = [θεtC
1−(1/η)




The random preference shocks (εt, εt) are strictly stationary, have unit means, and finite vari-
ances. The preference parameters θ and η represent the relative weight assigned to private goods
and the substituion parameter that measures the curvature of the indifference curves respectively.
With the assumption that the agent’s utility function is time separable, the optimal consumption
bundle Ce satisfies the equality condition between marginal rate of substitution and relative price.


















































and β1 = η.
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is the regressand. We discuss
this more in Section 2.2.1
2.2.1 Data and Estimation
We employ annual data for 1960 to 2015 from the World Development Indicators (World Bank
2015) for three countries Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria. To obtain the the consumption ratio, Ct/Gt
we divide, household final consumption expenditure by general government final consumption
expenditure, both in 2010 constant dollars. In light of Kwan (2007), the corresponding prices P ct
and P gt are computed as the implicit price deflators which are constructed by dividing the nominal
private and government consumption series by their respective constant price series.
As standard in the literature, we begin by studying the time series properties of the con-




t ). Figure 2.1 shows the log consumption and price ratio
for Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria. Individually, both series show strong persistence for all the three
countries suggesting that they may be cointegrated and possibly I(1). Table 2.1 reports the formal
unit root test results. It is evident from the table that, for all the countries, the unit root null
hypothesis is not rejected for the level series however it is strongly rejected when we employ the
first differenced series. Specifically, this shows that the log price and consumption ratio series are
both I(1).
Additionally, the p-values obtained for the case of the level series suggests that the log price
ratio has a weaker random walk component than that of its counterpact, the log consumption
ratio. That is, the log price ratio is less integrated than the log consumption ratio. As proposed
by Ng and Perron (1997), it is more desirable to put the more integrated series as the regressor
and the less integrated series as the regressand. Applying the Ng and Perron rule to our case
means that the cointegration regression we will be estimating the reverse of Eq(2.7). That is,
the log price ratio, ln(P gt /P
c
t ), will be the regressand and ln(Ct/Gt) the regressor. The related













To intepret the results from Eq.(2.7), the parameter of interest will be 1/α1. Indeed, 1/α1
should be equal to β1, where β1 is the estimator from the direct regression in Eq.(2.6). However,
with finite sample the estimates from the direct regression and the reverse regression have a
tendency of being far from being reciprocal to each other and in certain cases have very stark
different statistical properties.13











Egypt -1.2338 -1.6312 -5.6590 -3.3603
(0.6506) (0.4559) (0.0000) (0.0200)
Kenya -2.3123 -2.6086 -6.8890 -7.7397
(0.4203) (0.2783) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Nigeria -1.8301 -2.0456 -6.6772 -6.6164
(0.6671) (0.5557) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: P-values are in parenthesis. The lags of the dependent variable used to obtain white- noise residuals are
determined using Shwartz Information Criterion (SIC). H0: Series has aunit root. H0: Series does not have a unit
root. Exogenous variables: Constant and Linear Trend. MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Figure 2.2 provides preliminary correlation analysis of the two series for the full sample
period and sub-period.14 The figure depicts a consistent and negative correlation between the
two series for Egypt. This implies private and government consumption may be complements
in Egypt. The relationship for Kenya as shown in the second column is negative for the entire
sample period. However, this relationship switches to a positive relationship when the sub-period
13Kwan (2007) offers a deeper discussion on this. We report the results from the direct estimation in Appendix
C.1. The results from the direct estimation have the same statistical properties as the reverse estimation, however,
the estimators β̂1 is quantitative different from α̂1
14The sub-periods are arbitrary chosen and are different for each country due to data availability. More impor-
tantly, the idea of the sub-period analysis is to demonstrate that aside from country differences, the relationship
between private consumption and government consumption for a particular country can change overtime.
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1970-2015 is considered. Finally, in the third column, there appears to be a consistent positive
correlation between the price and consumption ratios, suggesting a tendency of government and
private consumption to be substitutes in Nigeria.
Two points are clear from the preliminary results from figure 2.2. First, the relationship (sign)
and the degree of substitutability/complementarity betweeen private and government consumption
varies across countries. Second, within countries, the degree of subsitutability can change over
time and in some cases, the relationship between the two goods can switch sign as in the case of
Kenya.
2.2.2 Estimation Results
Table C.1 reports the cointegrating regression results from estimating Eq.(2.7) for the three aid
dependent countries selected. The table also reports results for the sub-samples periods. It is
important that we check for robustness, hence we employ three different estimation methodologies–
the fully modified ordinary least square (FM-OLS) by Phillips and Hansen (1990); the canonical
cointegrating regression (CCR) by Park (1992); and Stock and Watson’s (1993) dynamic ordinary
least square (DOLS). These estimation methods are are all asymptotically efficient procedures for
estimating cointegration regressions.
We estimated the cointegration equation with the log price ratio as the dependent variable,
hence we are interested in the reciprocal of â1. Specifically, to interpret the results from table
C.1 we use the computed value, 1/α̂1, which governs the degree of substitution/complementarity
between private and government consumption. Generally, the estimated parameter values for α̂0
and α̂1 are stable across the estimation methods. The DOLS estimates yield the lowest values for
α̂1 hence the highest values for 1/α̂1. Particularly, for the full sample, the degree of substitution
for Egypt is negative and greater than 1, revealing strong complementarity between the two
goods. In Kenya, although the values for α̂1 are negative, they are statistically insignificant (not
different from zero) so is 1/α̂1. This indicates that government spending is “non-useful/wasteful”
on aggregate for the full sample period in Kenya. In constrast to Kenya and Egypt, α̂1 values for
the full sample for Nigeria is positive with and greater than 1 implying values of 1/α̂1 less than 1.
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Table 2.2: Cointegration Regressions Results
FM-OLS CCR DOLS
α̂0 α̂1 α̂0 α̂1 α̂0 α̂1
Egypt
FS: 1975 - 2015 0.7485*** -0.9621*** 0.7488*** -0.9383*** 0.7462*** -0.7183**
(0.0211) (0.4410) (0.0218) (0.2925) (0.0177) (0.2763)
SS: 1985 - 2015 0.7757*** -0.0765 -0.7759*** -0.0717 0.7714*** -0.0375
(0.0211) (0.4410) (0.0197) (0.3654) (0.0207) (0.4525)
Kenya
FS: 1960 - 2015 -0.5974*** -0.0704 -0.5877*** -0.0830 -0.6092*** -0.0222
(0.2032) (0.2469) (0.1719) (0.2054) (0.1623) (0.1996)
SS: 1970 - 2015 -1.4365*** 1.0602*** -1.4041*** 1.0171*** -1.2910*** 0.8760***
(0.2950) (0.3830) (0.2767) (0.3580) (0.2236) (0.2894)
Nigeria
FS:1982 - 2015 -0.9645*** 1.0516*** -0.9658*** 1.0517*** -0.8967*** 1.0025***
(0.1795) (0.1136) (0.1853) (0.1152) (0.1960) (0.1213)
SS: 1990 - 2015 - 0.8307*** 0.9412*** -0.8309*** 0.9410*** -0.8108*** 0.9320***
(0.0636) (0.0944) (0.1466) (0.0953) (0.1610) (0.1033)
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(P gt /P
g
t ). FS=Full Sample and SS= sub-Sample. Standard errors in paren-
theses. FM-OLS is Fully modified OLS; CCR is Canonical cointegrating regression; and DOLS is Dynamic OLS.
FM-OLS and CCR use Andrew’s automatic bandwith selection method in computing the long-run variance matrix.
DOLS includes one lead and one lag of the first difference of the regressors in the augmented regression.
This strongly suggests that government spending and private consumption are moderate or weak
substitutes.
When the arbitrary sub-periods are considered, we find that although the sign of α̂1 remain
positive for Nigeria, the degree of substitutability decreases, with α̂1 attaining values less than 1
which translates to 1/α̂1 values greater than 1. This means private and government consumption
become strong substitutes in Nigeria over the sub-sample. The sign for α̂1 switches from negative
and insignificant for the full sample period to positive and statistically significant in Kenya. The
related 1/α̂1 values for the FM-OLS and CCR estimates of α̂1 is less than 1 implying that private
and government consumption are weak substitutes. However, the corresponding 1/α̂1 from the
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DOLS estimate of α̂1 is greater than 1 which indicates strong substitutability between the two
goods in Kenya. For Egypt, the results from the sub-sample means that government spending is
non-useful/wasteful since α̂1 becomes positive but statistically insignificant.
The results from the table highlights two points. First, given the three countries selected for
the analyses, it is clear that the degree of substitutability varies across countries. This has direct
consequences on how a marginal increase in government spending due to an additional inflow of
foreign aid may impact the economy in various countries. Second, within countries, the degree of
substitutability/complementarity can change over time. This fact is captured via the estimates
from the sub-period. The implication here is that, the dynamic effect of fungible can vary across
time in a given country. For instance, in Nigeria, the degree of substitubility between the two
goods gets stronger when the sub-period 1990-2015 is considered.
2.3 Dynamic Model with Fungible Aid and Useful ‘G’
In Section 2.2, we provided empirical evidence of intra-temporal relationship between private
and government consumption revealing that government spending is useful and can either be a
substitute or complement to private consumption in aid-dependent economies. The evidence of
useful government spending and its variation across countries have direct implications on the
macroeconomic effects of aid when aid fungibility. To study the macroeconomic implications of
foreign aid fungibility when govenment spending is useful, we adopt a parsimoniuos dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model for our analysis.15
The model comprises the following economic agents: (i) A representative household agent
who populates an aid-dependent economy. This agent supplies labor inputs for firms; (ii) a mo-
nopolistically competitive firm who hires this agent as labor to produce differentiated goods which
is in turn demanded by final good firms to produce final goods; (iii) a government sector that
conducts both fiscal policy through levying lump sum taxes and issuing of one-period bonds to
fund public spending and (iv) a monetary authority that conducts monetary policy by targeting
15To keep the model tractable and allow for analytical explanations, we assume a closed economy. We must add
that extending our model to an open economy is straightforward.
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inflation and output gap and finally (v) an altruistic foreign agent who disburses aid to support
the recipient country’s general budget. The breakdown of the economy is as follows:
2.3.1 Households
A typical household agent in the aid dependent country gains utility from government spending Gt
in addition to their personal consumption Ct. Specifically, the way the agent internalizes a given
Gt into their utility can serve as a complement, a substitute or purely wasteful. The instantaneous
utility of the agent is therefore given by: 16








+ V (Gt) (2.8)
where χ > 0; γ > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion; η ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frish
elasticity of labor supply; αg ≥ 1 means Gt is a strong substitute to Ct with perfect substitution
when αg = 1. Gt is a complement to Ct if α < 0 while Gt is a weak substitute to Ct if 0 < αg < 1.
The case were αg = 0 suggests that Gt is wasteful/non-useful.
17 V (Gt) ensures that when αg < 0
the marginal utility of Gt do not attain negative values.
18 The representative household agent




βtu(Ct, Nt, Gt) (2.9)
with β ∈ (0, 1) as the discount factor. Since there is a continuum of consumption goods available











16 Karass (1994) uses this functional form of the utility function for his empirical study. See also Bailey (1971),
Barro (1981), Kormendi (1983), and Aschauer(1985). However, this formulation is more empirically restrictive
but offers more analytical tractability (Kwan (2007)). Hence, for analytical tractability we employ a monotonic
transformation of the functional form employed by Karass (1994) for the theoretical anaylsis. Our functional form
is consistent with Fève et al. (2013) and Ganelli and Tervela (2009) to mention a few.
17The empirical studies in Section 2 covers all these scenarios.
18Since household takes Gt as given, they do not maximize it, hence V (Gt) do not appear in the FOC of household.
However, for welfare evaluation, V (.) plays a vital role. We do not study welfare analysis here.
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where i ∈ (0, 1) represents the continuum of differentiated final goods and ε > 1 governs the
elasticity of substitution between different final goods.














In the household budget constraint, Bt denotes the quantity of one-period nominal bond held
by the household, Rt−1 is the nominal return to bonds, Tt corresponds to lump-sum taxes levied
on households, and Dt is profits.
2.3.2 Optimality Conditions
The first order conditions for the optimizing agent’s problem is given as:
Intratemporal Euler : χNηt = (Ct + αgGt)
−γwt (2.12)











Eq.(2.12) relates the marginal utility gained from effective consumption to labor supply.
Eq.(2.13) on the other hand defines the intermporal Euler equation for consumption by relating
present consumption to future consumption. The presence of useful government spending means
the path of government spending policy is relevant in determining the optimal path of consumption.
2.3.3 Firms
There are two types of firms in the economy, monopolistically competitive intermediate goods
producers who produce a continuum of differentiated goods and competitive final goods producers.
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Production of Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods producing firm i has access to a constant returns to scale technology,
Yt(i) = ANt(i) (2.14)
where Yt(i) is output of the intermediate firm i, A is a constant technology common to all firms
and Nt(i) is the amount of labor the firm hires. The firm thus minimizes its total cost subject to
the production technology.
Price setting
A final goods producing firm purchases intermediate inputs at nominal price Pt(i) and produces








ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Profit-maximization by the final goods






Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producing firm i chooses price Pt(i) to maximize










is the household’s stochastic discount factor, Dt(i) are nominal profits for firm






















where ψ ≥ 0 governs adjustment costs, Ψt(i) is real marginal cost. Price adjustments are intro-
duced through Rotemberg (1982) quadratic costs of adjustment reflecting the negative effect that
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price changes can have on firm-customer relationship. In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms make
identical decisions and hence the first order condition is given as follows:


















2.3.4 Government Policy and Aid Modality
Foreign aid flows At supports the general budget of the recipient government who levies lump-sum









Aid takes the form of uncondiitional budget support and hence the benovolent foreign agent









where 0 < ρA < 1 and the exogenous shifter in official development assistance, εAt is an i.i.d with
zero mean and standard deviation σA.









where T is the steady-state level of Tt and b =
B
P
is steady-state real debt, and ζ1 governs the
degree to which taxes respond to real debt.









hence Rt responds to inflation through ρπ. The monetary policy shock ε
R
t is an i.i.d with zero
mean and standard deviation σR. R and π are steady state values for the nominal interest rate
and inflation respectively.
Finally, since aid is fungible, to close the model we specify government expenditure Gt so


















where 0 ≤ φG < 1 is the AR(1) coefficient of Gt, 1 > φF ≥ 0 is the parameter that governs the
degree of aid fungibility, φB ≤ 0 captures the response of government spending to the countries
debt, φY ≥ 0 governs government spending response to output in a procyclical fashion as in Alesina
et al. (2005) and εGt captures the exogenous government spending policy shifter and is assumed
i.i.d shock with zero mean and standard deviation σG.
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2.3.5 Resource Constraint
Aggregate output of the economy is not only allocated to consumption and government expenditure
but also to price adjustment costs which is in the unit of output. Thus the model is completed by
a resource constraint given as:








2.4 Analytical and Numerical Results
2.4.1 Interplay of Useful Government Spending and Fungible Aid
Here, we provide an analytical intuition on how the relationship between private and government
consumption plays a role in impacting aid effectiveness when aid is fungible. To achieve this, we
19For our analytical model we set φG = φB = φY = 0 while for the numerical analysis, we only set φG = φY = 0
to generate convenient impulse response functions. Switching on these parameters for the numerical analyses do
not change the qualitative results of our model.
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employ the log-linearized version of the of the following set of equations: Eq.(2.12), Eq.(2.14),
Eq.(2.21) and the policy rule for government spending, Eq.(2.20). Additionally, we make the
following simplifying assumptions: (i) we assume that the steady state level of government spend-
ing, Ḡ is zero, which is a special case of Ḡ ≥ 0 and (ii) we assume wt = w̄. Employing these
assumptions Eq (2.12) yields:
η(ĉt + ĝt) = −(ĉt + αgĝt)⇒ (1 + η)ĉt = −(α + η)ĝt (2.22)















Critical to Eq.(2.24) is the fact that foreign aid is fungible. Hence combining the government








B b̂t−1 + φ
Y ŷt + ε
G
t ) (2.25)
with focus on foreign aid, we can convieniently drop the exogenous shifter (εGt ) and the other







20Gannelli and Tervala (2009) show that as long as η < −αg consumption’s response to government spending is
positive. Which suggests that the effectiveness of goverment spending on consumption depends on η. Our focus is
on aid’s impact on total output hence we focus on Eq. (2.26).
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It is clear that, with fixed values of η ≥ 0 the effectiveness of aid on output (sign of ∂yt/∂at)
when aid is fungible (i.e. φF > 0) ultimately depends on sign of the preference parameter αg.
Thus setting φF > 0 and η ≥ 0 it follows that φF
1+η
> 0. Now considering Eq.(2.27) the following
propositions emerge:
PROPOSITION 1: If government spending is complementary to private consumption αg < 0











PROPOSITION 2: If government spending is a weak substitute to private consumption, 0 ≤














COROLLARY 1: It follows from proposition 1 and 2 that if α < 1 then aid has a positive






PROPOSITION 3: If government spending is a strong substitute to private consumption and
α > 1 then foreign aid at has a negative impact on output yt.










Quality of Institutions, Fungibility, and Aid Effectiveness
Active arguments still remain following the work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) on whether foreign
aid contributes to an already existing poor policy environment and institutions in developing
nations or whether poor quality institutions do in fact reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid.21 In
21See for instance Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Knack (2001), Kolstad et al. (2008), Easterly (2003), Okada
and Samreth (2012), Asongu (2013), Bräutigam et al. (2004). The importance of institutional quality as a key
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this paper and as part of our contribution to the extensive literature on aid and institutions, we
control for the quality of institutions in the recipient country and investigate the hypothesis that
poor quality institutions negatively impact aid effectiveness.
Certain types of aid are particularly vulnerable to corruption. The large and complex nature
of donor-funded projects tend to provide scope for bribery, plundering, and fraud. Fungible aid
transfers such as general budget support which may be less easy to trace are also susceptible to
corruption.22 In the baseline model we assumed the economy is free from any institutional ineffi-
ciencies that can lead to “plundering/wastefulness of public funds” through lack of accountability,
transparency and corruption. To account for the role of the quality of institutions, we assume
that some level of institutional inefficiency exists. To capture this we assume that public funds
in the form of government spending generated by the fungibile aid are mismanaged, lost, and/or
pludered at a rate ζ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus to analyse the effect of institutional inefficience we modify the government spending
policy as follows23:
gt = (1− ζ)φFat + εGt (2.28)















Effect of Intitutional Inefficiencies
(2.29)
The following results emerge from Eq. (2.29):
COROLLARY 3: If government spending is a complement or a weak substitute to private con-
sumption with α < 1 then institutional ineffieciencies (e.g. corruption and inefficient bureaucracy)
offsets the positive impact of foreign aid on output, (dyt/dat) when aid is fungible.
factor to aid effectiveness is highlighted by Alesina and Dollar (2000) who find that some donors actually do take
institutional quality seriously and in turn disburse aid based on the recipient country’s quality of institution.
22See for instance Morrissey (2006) and Leiderer (2012)
23The modelling of institutional inefficiencies follows similar modelling style in d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni
(2016)
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COROLLARY 4: If government spending is a strong substitute to private consumption and
α > 1 then institutional ineffieciencies (e.g. inefficient bureaucracy) mitigates the negative effect
of foreign aid on output, dyt/dat. when aid is fungible.






< 0. It is straight forward to show

















Our model assumes a representative agent in the economy. However, in most developing coun-
tries that depend on foreign aid, there is evidence that a fraction of agents are credit contrained
and cannot participate in the credit market, bond market and/or do not own firms.24 These
households are termed as rule-of-thumb household– households who simply consume their current
income.25 To ensure that the analytical results from the propositions are robust to these modelling
assumptions, we incorperate into our standard model two types of household. A household that
is not credit constrained and one who is credit contrained and thus consume their current income.
Following some simplifying assumption we show that the main results obtained earlier still hold.
To facilitate discussion the proof for the case of heterogenous agents is left to the appendix. See
Appendix C.2 for proof.
2.4.2 Discussion
We now discuss the main results from the propositions. Recall that foreign aid fungibility refers
to the marginal increase in government spending in response to the additional aid that flow into
to the recipient countries. In this sense, the macroeconomic effects of aid, when it is fungible, has
to be evaluated through the lenses of the impact of government spending on economy. Our focus
will therefore be on the impact of the marginal increase in government spending in the economy
24Deaton (1992); Rasmussen (2002); Duflo (2003); Banerjee and Duflo (2005); Edmonds (2006) and Berg (2012)
provide evidence of credit constraint households in developing countries.
25See Campbell and Mankiw (1989).
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following an inflow of aid given complementarity/substitutabilty between private and government
consumption.
To facilitate discussion, we begin our analysis from the baseline scenario of nonuseful/wasteful
government spending (αg = 0). When government spending is wasteful, an increase in it, crowds
consumption due to standard wealth effects due to increase in taxes.26 This in turn influences
households to cut down consumption and increase work hours as leisure falls. Although consump-
tion falls, the increases in labor hours causes output rises. Essentially, if government spending
is wasteful, the standard negative wealth effects resulting from an increase in government spend-
ing will reduce consumption, increase labor hours and output. This is the standard transmission
mechanism of government spending in the economy when it not useful. Consequently, an increase
in fungible aid is increases the output of the receipient country when government spending is
wasteful.
We now turn to the case where government spending in useful. We focus on the preference
parameters αg that governs the degree of substitutability/complementarity and fix the preference
parameter that governs labor supply, η to unity to facilitate discussion.
When government spending and private consumption are complements (αg < 0), an increase
in government spending results in an increase of the marginal utility of consumption (Gannelli and
Tervela(2009)). This in turn causes households to substitute leisure for consumption. Additionally,
if government spending is complementary to private consumption, from Proposition 1, increase
in government spending due to aid fungibility enhances labor effort by reducing the marginal
disutility of giving up leisure. Basically, the leisure consumpiton substitution offsets the standard
wealth effect generated in the case where αg = 0. This simultaneous increase in labor hours and
consumption drives an increase in output. Thus if households internalize government spending as
a complement to private consumption, our model predicts that fungible foreign aid will increase
output and induce growth.
The transmission mechanism for the case where government spending and private consump-
tion are weak substitutes (0 ≤ αg < 1) substitutes is the same as the case of complementarity.
26In our model, since taxes are lump-sum, Ricardian Equivalence is extent, hence it does not matter whether
government purchases are financed with current taxes or deficit spending.
77
That is, from Proposition 2 , if the two goods are weak substitutes, then aid even when it is
fungible, still has positive impacts on output. However, this positive effect is smaller for the case
of of weak substitutes compared to the case where the two goods are complements. This results
is evident in Corollary 1
In constrast, from Proposition 3, when private and government consumption are stong sub-
stitutes (i.e. αg > 1), increase in fungible foreign aid flow has the exact opposite effects on output.
Specifically, in addition to the standard negative wealth effects, an aid induced government spend-
ing crowds out private consumption since the two goods are strong substitutes. Moreover, a
government spending that is a substitute to private consumption generates strong disutility for
labor effort hence discouraging work and making leisure relatively attractive. This can be thought
of as a behavioral subsidy cost of government spending.27 Thus, the increase in government spend-
ing due to fungible aid, results in a simultaneous fall in labor hours and consumption leading to
a fall in output.
Tying these theoretical results to the empirical findings in Section 2.2, all other things being
equal, a country such as Egypt where government and private consumption are complements or
Kenya, where the two goods are weak substitutes, aid, when it is fungible is not a problem since
the marginal increase in government spending due to an inflow of fungible aid have a positive
aggregates effects on the economy. This is not the case in Nigeria were the two goods are strong
substitutes– fungible aid will lead to contractionary macroeconomic effects.
On the quality of institutions, conditional on the relationship between private and government
consumption, our model predicts that, institutional quality only plays an offsetting or enhancing
role in aid effectivenes when aid is fungible. Particularly, the positive impact of fungible foreign
aid on output when αg is less than 1 diminishes(enhances) as public sector inefficiencies– governed
by ζ– increases (decreases). On the other hand, weak institutional factor, including corruption
27The behavioral subsidy cost: Government spending encourages destructive choices. Many government programs
subsidize economically undesirable decisions. welfare programs encourage people to choose leisure over work. Un-
employment insurance programs provide an incentive to remain unemployed. Flood insurance programs encourage
construction in flood plains. These are all examples of government programs that reduce economic growth and
diminish national output because they promote misallocation or underutilization of resources (Mitchell (2005)).
In relation to an aid induced government spending, this mechanism or channel can be rationalized along the lines
that, foreign aid affects a recipient country’s psyche, making them lazy and indolent, .
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offsets the negative macroeconomic effects generated by fungible aid when government and private
consumption are strong substitutes (i.e. αg is greater than 1).
In the context of this paper, this last results can be explained as follows: (i) Since government
spending is a strong substitute to private consumption and in turn crowds out consumption and
reduces labor effort, the fact that not all government spending induced by fungible aid enters
the economy due to corruption reduces the negative impacts of fungible aid. Also, our model
assumes a closed economy hence also although public funds end up in “private pockets”, they
are in turn spent in the economy, offsetting any original lose in output caused by institutional
inefficiencies.28 However, if we assume illicit capital flight–illegal government funds moving across
borders to private accounts–this result has the tendency of changing.29
In summary, from the analytical results, aid fungibility does not appear to be a problem
when governement spending is purely wasteful, complementary, or a weak substitute to private
consumption. This conclusion, however, reverses course when private and government consump-
tion are strong substitutes. In such a case, fungibile aid have detrimental effects on output. Fi-
nally, institutional factors such transparency, accountability, and corruption playing a mitigating
or enhancing role on these effect of aid when is fungible.
2.4.3 Numerical Example
Calibration offers the quickest way to assess the usefulness of successive extension or modification
of a model (DeJong and Dave (2007)). Thus to a provide a panoptic view of our analytical results,
we calibrate the parameters of the model and simulate the model to compare the dynamics the
key macroeconomic variables following a foreign aid shock. Specifically, guided by our empirical
results in section 2, we simulate the model for three imaginary aid dependent economies that have
the same macroeconomic environment. That is, these economies have the same level of fungibil-
ity, policy environment (fiscal, and monetary) and institutional factors– but differ in the degrees
28Other channels where institutional inefficiencies such as corruption can be a “positive” includes for instance,
Heckelman and Powell (2010) who find that corruption can facilitate growth by permitting private agents, particular,
entrepreneurs avoid inefficient policies and regulations when economic freedom is limited. Although our model does
not study economic freedom and corruption, it lays out another channel to which some institutional inefficiencies
can lead to efficiencies.
29This case is left to future work.
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of substitutability/complementarity between government spending and private consumption gov-
erned by αg to study the impact of foreign aid when it is fungible. This strategy allows us to isolate
the true role of the relationship between private and government consumption when assessing the
macroeconomic impact of aid when it is fungible. Moreover, it permits us to borrow parameters
values from the existing literature without the restraint of estimating parameter values for specific
economies.30 Hence, for the simulation, the model is log-linearized, calibrated in a standard way,
and solved numerically using Dynare. We then compare the impulse response function of the key
macroeconomic variables following a foreign aid shock.
2.4.4 Parameter Calibration
The model is calibrated at an annual frequency since foreign aid flows are usually disbursed in
annual basis. Table 3.2 provides the calibrated parameter values. A subset of the parameters are
chosen based on previous studies and are standard in the literature. Specifically, preferences over
consumption are logarithmic, hence γ = 1. The Frisch labor supply elasticity is set to unity, so
η = 1 and χ is set such that the steady state share of time spent in employment is 1/3. With
guidance from our estimation of the degree of substitutability between private and govenment
consumption, we set αg such that it lies in the interval, [-2,2]. In particular, for the three imaginary
economies, we set αg to -1.5, 0.75, and 1.5. Nominal interest rates in aid dependent economies are
generally high, we therefore set the subjective discount factor β to 0.927 to reflect a moderately
high steady state gross nominal interest rate of 7.87 percent. The common technology parameter,
A is set to normalize the deterministic steady state level of out to 1. Prices are more flexible at
annual frequency (Davig et al (2011) and Richter (2015)). Thus, the adjustment cost parameter ψ
is set to 10 to reflect evidence of low price rigidity in developing economies (see for instance Urama
et al. (2015)). The parameter that governs the degree of fungibility φF is set to 0.5. This means
for every $1 inflow of aid, government spending goes up by 50 cents.31 The parameter governing
30Developing countries have a long standing history with data availability. In an ongoing work, we are constructing
data for some of these countries to allow for country specific model estimation.
31For instance Njeru (2003) finds that a shilling increase in ODA leads to 88 cents increase in government
spending.
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institutional quality ζ ∈ [0, 1] but it is set to zero in the baseline simulation.32 The steady-state
values of the variables in the model set to follow previous studies or are model implied. For the
model implied steady state values see Appendix C.3.
Table 2.3: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Name Symbol Value Parameter Name Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.927 Steady-state output Y 1
Subtitutability b/n Ct & Gt αg [−2, 2] Steady-state tax-to-GDP ratio T/Y 0.175
Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/η 1 Steady-state gov. spending share G/Y 0.20
Elasticity of Intertemporal substitution 1/γ 1 Steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio b/Y 0.40
Price elastitcity of demand ε 7.666 Steady-state gross inflation rate π 1.00
Rotemberg Adjustment Cost Coef. ψ 10 Steady-state aid-to-GDP ratio Aid/Y 0.0565
Inflation coef.: monetary rule φπ 1.5 Degree of aid fungibility φF 0.50
Debt coefficient: tax rule α 0.15 Debt coefficient: gov. spending rule φB 0.05
Steady-state labor N 0.33 AR(1) Coef. in Aid process ρA 0.85
Steady-state gross nominal interest rate R 7.87 Standard deviation of the aid shock σA 0.01
2.4.5 Impact of fungible foreign aid shock with different of degrees of substitutability,
αg
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response functions of selected macroeconomic variables following a 1
percent increase in foreign aid (official development assistance (ODA)) to GDP ratio when aid is
fungible and there exist complementarity/subsitutability between consumption and public spend-
ing. Given the different degrees of substitutability between private and government consumption,
it is clear that when is aid fungible it has very contrasting impact on key macroeconomic variables.
Particularly, from the red line in the figure, when government and private consumption are
complements (αg = −1.5), a foreign aid shock, will induce an increase in output, consumption,
labor hours worked, and inflation on impact when aid is fungible. The mechanism is as follows: an
increase in foreign aid inflow increases public spending since aid is fungible. Here, an aid induced
increase in government spending when αg < 0, generates a consumption leisure effect that is
strong enough to reverse the standard wealth effects that will usually cause a fall in consumption
32Appendix C.5 shows the construction of ζ from the World Banks Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating.
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following a rise in government spending. Specifically, since government and private consumption
are complements, an increase in government consumption as a result of aid inflows increases the
marginal utility of consumption and reduces the marginal disutility of work effort. This effect
then stimulates consumption, increases labor effort and in turn leads to a rise in output.
Consequently, the increase in consumption and output causes inflation to rise through demand
pull factors. This results and mechanism are similar for the case where government consumption
is a weak substitute to private consumption, 0 < αg < 1 (i.e. αg = 0.75) as given by the blue
dashed line. However, consistent with Corollary 1, when 0 < αg < 1 and aid is fungible, the
positive effect of foreign aid on output, is smaller compared to the case when government and
private consumption are complements, αg < 0. Moreover, since government spending is a weak
subsitute to private consumption, the increase in public spending causes consumption to fall.
In constrast, when government and private consumption are strong substitutes, (αg = 1.5),
the increase in government spending due to fungibility reinforces the standard wealth effects and
induces a fall in consumption. However, the fall in consumption does not translate into an increase
in labor hours as in the case where government spending is wasteful αg = 0. This is because in
this case where αg > 1, there is an additional disutility to work since government consumption
enters the private agents utility as a substitute. This additional disutility along side the standard
wealth effects on consumption leads to contractionary effects on output. Hence, the impact of
aid induces negative macroeconomic effects on consumption, labor hours, output, and inflatiom–
results consistent with Proposition 3.
2.4.6 Role of Institutional Factors
With a given level of substitutability we now assess how institutional inefficiencies such as low
accountability, corruption, and inefficient bureacracy in the public sector, governed by the param-
eter, ζ, in the recipient impacts the effects of fungible aid. ζ is set to a moderate and high values
of 0.2 and 0.5 respectively and compared to the case where there are no institutional inefficiencies
ζ = 0.
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Figure 2.4 depicts the effects of institutional inefficiencies for the case where private and
government consumption are complements with set at αg = 1.5. From the figure, inefficiencies in
the public domain including corruption, low accountability and transparency as well as inefficient
bureacracy reduces the positive effects of aid when it is fungible. Particularly, when government
and private consumption are complements, high institutional inefficiencies that lead to waste in
public funds or plundering of public funds in the recipient country negatively impacts the positive
macroeconomic effects of aid when is fungible and vice versa. This results is consistent with
Corollary 3
As shown in figure 2.5, similar to the case of complementarity, the effect of institutonal
inefficiencies on the impact of fungible aid on the economy is similar for the case where private
and government consumption are weak substitutes 0 < αg < 1. Specifically, if inefficiencies are
low, fungible aid has a stronger positive effect on labor hours worked and on output following
an increase in government spending. The opposite effect occurs when institutional inefficiencies
are high. High inefficiencies however, mitigates the fall in consumption as there is less increase of
government spending to crowd out/substitute private consumption.
Finally, figure 2.6 depicts the impulse response from a shock to foreign aid in the case where
government and private consumption are strong subsititutes and αg > 1. The results show that
higher the public inefficiency mitigates the negative effects of fungible aid. This results seems
counterintuitive, however as explained in Corollary 4 there are two ways to rationalize this: First,
aid that directly/indirectly funds government spending that do not benefit the people will be more
beneficial if they never enter the economy– the less is better argument. In this case, public ineffi-
ciencies reduces the degree of foreign aid fungibility which in tend lowers how much government
spending is increased. Second, since our model is a closed economy, we can rationalize that the
plundered funds somehow returns into the economy in a useful way that mitigates the original
negative impacts of fungible aid when the two goods are strong substitutes.
In summary, all else equal, when government and private consumption are either comple-
ments or weak substitute (i.e. αg < 1), foreign aid inflows has expansionary effects on the re-
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cipient country’s output even when aid is fungible. In constrast, fungibility becomes a genuine
problem when government and private consumption are strong substitutes since the impact of the
marginal increase in government spending as a result of foreign aid flows has severe negative and
contractionary effects on the macroeconomy of the recipient country.
Inefficiencies in the public domain reduces the positive effects of foreign aid when government
consumption is a complement/weak substitute to private consumption while mitigating the neg-
ative effects of foreign aid fungibility when strong substitutability exists between the two goods.
These findings are consistent with the analytical results in Section 4.1.
2.5 Conclusion
The discussion on the impacts of fungible aid is very active. In this paper, we have studied
how the intratemporal relationship between private and government consumption impacts the
macroeconomic effects of foreign aid when it is fungible. Employing data from Egypt, Kenya, and
Nigeria we estimate a structural cointegration regression of the ratio of the two goods and their
relative prices and study the degree of complementarity/subsititutability between consumption
and public spending. The results for the full sample show that in Egypt the two goods are
complement, in Kenya there appears to be no relationship between the two goods, and in Nigeria,
the two goods are weak substitutes. However, estimates from subsample periods show that private
and government consumption are strong substitutes in Nigeria and weak substitutes in Kenya. The
results for Egypt show no relationship between the two goods. The empirical results shows that
on aggregate government spending is useful and its relationship with private consumption varies
across countries and time in a given country.
With motivation from the empirical results we develop a tractable macroeconomic model
of fungible aid that explicitly incorporates the intratemporal relationship between private and
government consumption into consumer utility. We then investigate the role of the degree of
substitutability/complementary between the two goods on impacting the macroeconomic effects
of fungible aid. Three key findings emerge from our analytical and numerical results:
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1. when government spending is a complement or weak substitute to private consumption, the
marginal increase in government spending due to a rise in fungible aid results in expan-
sionary macroeconomic effects–increasing aggregate output in the recipient country. These
expansionary effects are stronger when the two goods are complements;
2. in the case where government spending is a strong substitutes to private consumption, the
additional rise in government spending due an inflow in fungible aid generates contractionary
macroeconomic effects in the receipient country’s economy;
3. when we control for quality of institutions in the receipient country, we find that weak public
institutional factors such as high corruption and inefficient bureaucracy reduces the positive
effect of foreign aid in (1) and offsets the negative effects of foreign aid in (2). They however,
do not change the impact of aid.
Despite our modelling assumptions we can draw the following broad conclusions. With fungibility
in play omitting a prior the substitutability/complementarity channel between the two goods when
evaluating the macroeconomic effects of aid can bias the impact of aid. The latter is robust even
after controlling for institutional inefficiencies.
From a policy perspective, the results suggests that in the presence of fungibility, the direct
subsitution between private and public consumption is equally if not more important in improving
aid effectiveness in developing countries. This channel provides policymakers and donors alike an
additional avenue that can be explored to tailor strategic policies that can greatly improve aid
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Figure 2.1: Private and government consumption ratio and relative price
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) and author’s computations.
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Figure 2.2: Correlation between log consumption ratio and log price ratio
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of the macroeconomic effects of an increase in fungible aid (official development assistance)
following a positive shock to official development assistance given complementarity (αg = −1.5), weak substitutabil-
ity (αg = 0.75), and strong substitutability (αg = 1.5) between public spending and private consumption.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of institutional inefficiencies govened by ζ following a 1 percent shock to official development
assistance when consumption and public spending are complements with (αg = −1.5). ζ = 0.2 and ζ = 0.5
represent moderate and is high inefficiencies in the public sector respectively. ζ = 0 represents no institutional
inefficiencies.
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Figure 2.5: Effects of institutional inefficiencies govened by ζ following a 1 percent shock to official development
assistance when consumption and public spending are weak substitutes with (αg = 0.75). ζ = 0.2 and ζ = 0.5
represent moderate and is high inefficiencies in the public sector respectively. ζ = 0 represents no institutional
inefficiencies.
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Figure 2.6: Effects of institutional inefficiencies govened by ζ following a 1 percent shock to official development
assistance when consumption and public spending are strong substitutes with (αg = 1.5). ζ = 0.2 and ζ = 0.5





C.1 Direct Estimation Results
Table C.1: Cointegration Regressions Results
FM-OLS CCR DOLS
α̂0 α̂1 α̂0 α̂1 α̂0 α̂1
Egypt
FS: 1975 - 2015 0.4230** -0.5581** 0.4216** -0.5562** 0.4212** -0.5677**
(0.1691) (0.2280) (0.1699) (0.2301)) (0.1853) (0.2464)
SS: 1985 - 2015 -0.1448 0.1514 -0.0918 0.0842 -0.0603 0.0375
(0.2483) (0.3213) (0.2020) (0.2647) (0.2266) (0.0375)
Kenya
FS: 1960 - 2015 0.7201*** -0.1267 0.6820*** -0.1878 0.7468*** -0.0961
(0.1756) (0.2753) (0.1395) (0.2179) (0.1968) (0.3111)
SS: 1970 - 2015 1.0432*** 0.4409** 1.0426*** 0.4399** 1.0761*** 0.5004**
(0.1030) (0.1649) (0.1052) (0.1694) (0.1151) (0.1865)
Nigeria
FS:1982 - 2015 0.9680*** 0.8735** 0.9664*** 0.8739*** 0.9426*** 0.9093***
(0.0764) (0.0992) (0.0795) (0.0985)) (0.0873) (0.1112)
SS: 1990 - 2015 0.9141*** 1.0008*** 0.9102*** 1.0059*** 0.8773*** 1.0462***
(0.0636) (0.0944) (0.0668) (0.0979) (0.0760) (0.1086)
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(Ct/Gt). FS=Full Sample and SS= sub-Sample. Standard errors in paren-
theses. FM-OLS is Fully modified OLS; CCR is Canonical cointegrating regression; and DOLS is Dynamic OLS.
FM-OLS and CCR use Andrew’s automatic bandwith selection method in computing the long-run variance matrix.
DOLS includes one lead and one lag of the first difference of the regressors in the augmented regression.
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C.2 Model with Heterogenous Agents
Consider two sets of households in the economy, {R,N} where R and N represents Ricardian
Households and Non-Ricardian households respectively, where their masses sum up to one and
the proportion of non-Ricardian household is λ. Also for each of the the household the associated
variable will be xR,t and xN,t. The goal here is to show that the log-linearized intratemporal
Eq. (2.12) holds even with heterogenous households. By showing this, is suffices that the key
propositions of the model holds. It is important to know that, the associated intertemporal Euler
equation associated with the model with hetergenous agent is fundamentally different, see Gali et.
al (2007):
Ricardian Household : χNηR,t = (CR,t + αgGt)
−1wt (1.1B)
non-Ricardian Household : χNηN,t = (CN,t + αgGt)
−1wt (1.2B)
log-linearizing equation 1c and 2c while assuming Ḡ = 0 and normalizing wt = 1 yields:
ηn̂R,t = −(ĉR,t + αgĝt) (1.3B)
ηn̂N,t = −(ĉN,t + αgĝt) (1.4B)
consider now the aggregated consumption and labor hours weighted by the portion of each
household in the economy:
Ct = λCR,t + (1− λ)CN,t (1.5B)
Nt = λNR,t + (1− λ)NN,t (1.6B)
following the simplifying assumption N̄ = N̄N = N̄R = 1 and C̄ = C̄N = C̄R = 1 it is easy to
show that the log-linear versions of Eq.(1.5B) and (1.6B)
ĉt = λĉR,t + (1− λ)ĉN,t (1.7B)
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ĉt = λn̂R,t + (1− λ)n̂N,t (1.8B)
Now multiplying Eq (1.3A) and (1.4A) by λ and 1− λ respectively and adding the resulting
equations yields:
η(λn̂R,t + (1− λ)n̂N,t) = −(λĉR,t + (1− λ)ĉR,t)− αg(λĝt + (1− λ)ĝt) (1.9B)
employing Eq (1.7B) and (1.8B) we obtain an equation equivalent to the log-linearized version of
Eq(2.12):
ηn̂t = −(ĉt + αgĝt) (1.10B)
C.3 The Steady-State and Implied Parameters
Steady state values of the economic variables in the model are defined such that, for any time
period t, Xt = Xt+1 = X̄. Hence, at steady-state, the variable Xt is time invariant so the time
subscripts are dropped. Below are the equations defining steadystate values of the economic vari-













w̄ = AΨ̄ (1.4C)
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b̄+ Ḡ− T̄ − b̄ (1.6C)
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C.4 Full Log-Linearized Model
The dynamic economic problem presented in the paper takes on a system of non-linear difference
equations. Since there are no closed form solutions, I employ a first order Taylor expansion
to approximate the nonlinear model around the neighborhood of its steady-state and solve it
numerically. Particularly, for a smooth arbitrary function h(xt), the function is approximated
linearly as:
h(xt) = h(x) + h
′(x)(xt − x)
A variable, x̂ represents the variable’s deviation from its log steady-state value.
ȳŷt = c̄ĉt + ḡĝt (1.1D)
ŵt − (σc̄/(c̄+ αgḡ))ct − (σαgḡ/(c̄+ αgḡ))ĝt = (ηn̄/(n̄− 1))n̂t (1.2D)
σc̄/(c̄+ αgḡ)(ĉt+1 − ĉt) + σαgḡ/(c̄+ αgḡ)(ĝt+1 − ĝt) + π̂t+1 − r̂t = 0 (1.3D)
ŷt = n̂t (1.4D)
Ψ̂t = ŵt (1.5D)
π̂t = βπ̂t+1 + κΨ̂t (1.6D)
T̄ t̂t = r̄b̄/π̄(b̂t−1 + r̂t−1) + ḡĝt − b̄b̂t − āât (1.7D)
ĝt = (1− ζ)φF ât−1 − φB b̂t−1 + εgt (1.8D)
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ât = ρaât−1 + ε
a
t (1.9D)
r̂t = φππ̂t (1.10D)
t̂t = αb̂t−1 (1.11D)
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C.5 Calibrating Intitutional Inefficiencies, ζ
In the calibration for the numerical example we calibrate ζ using the World Banks’ Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public
sector rating (1=low to 6=high). We construct this index so that it lies between zero and one.
Definition: Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector assess the extent to
which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and for the results of its actions
by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees
within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and
results obtained. The three main dimensions assessed here are the accountability of the executive
to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil society to
information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests. Accordingly, higher
scores can be attained by a country that, given its stage of development, has a policy and institu-
tional framework that more strongly fosters growth and poverty reduction.
Data Source:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
The reconstruction is as follows of ζ
ζ = 1− CPIAcorr
Max. Value
Hence, when CPIAcorr = 6 ≡ 1 = ζc and ζc = 0 ≡ 1 = CPIAcorr.
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Chapter 3
Is There A Role for Discretionary
Government Spending In A Fiscally
Stressed Economy?: Extending Davig,
Leeper and Walker (2010)
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Abstract
Evaluating fiscal policy is difficult and usually not exhaustive. In this chapter, I extend Davig, Leeper
and Walker(2010) and study the implication of discretionary spending as an additional policy instru-
ment in an economy that faces a dual economic problem of severe economic downturn and fiscal stess–
explosive transfers, tax limit and high debt. Two key findings emerge: (1) although a particular policy
stance– either contractionary or expansionary– on discretionary government spending cannot eliminate
the fiscal stress and severe recession caused by the explosive transfers, their use as additional policies can
mitigate/worsen these effects. The mitigation or worsening effects of a specific policy stance on discre-
tionary spending vary in both the short run and long run; (2) The short-run/long-run effectiveness of a
paticular policy stance on discretionary government spending depends critically on how households in-
ternalize government spending in their utility– either complements or substitute to private consumption.
JEL Classification: E61, E62, H60




In the U.S, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections show that demographic shifts due
to aging population coupled with rising health care costs, and the expansion of federal subsidies for
health insurance will result in exploding government transfers. This will put an upward pressure
on the federal budget. In the absence of any aggressive policy changes and strategies, the debt to
GDP ratio will deviate from its long-run average of 38 percent.
Of course, projections of any economy are events that are yet to happen and hence several
uncertainty surrounds them. Moreover, to telescope their implications into the present requires
succint modelling of economic and policy uncertainty. The case of the CBO’s projections and their
corresponding policy options for resolution of the projections are no different.
In a growing literature, Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010); Davig and Leeper (2011); Richter
(2015) for instance show that these projections by the CBO will undoubtedly have huge macroe-
conomic implications on the future health of the economy if they do materialize. In fact, these
studies find that the “mere” probability of them occuring can have effects on economic agents
expectations which can impact current decisions. It is also clear that any dire macroeconomic
implications of these projections will occur in the presence of high debt levels–creating a dual
problem of recession and fiscal stress.
In light of the above, this paper focuses on discretionary government spending by studying
its role in an economy that faces the possibility of fiscal stress and severe economic downturn due
to the realization of an exploding transfer payment regime. In particular, to understand the role
and the implications of discretionary government spending policy in such an economy, this paper
extends Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) (DLW henceforth) and study how different discretionary
spending policy options can impact the consequences of exploding transfer regime in the presence
of a fiscal limit.
DLW show that in the presence of a fiscal limit, how the exponential tranfers are financed
in the future either through inflation or default on promised payments can cause severe economic
downturn and fiscal stress well before the fiscal limit is reached. However, they assume discre-
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tionary govenment spending as constant in their framework. This limits its role as a policy. Hence
this paper introduces discretionary as additional policy to policymakers in addressing the dual
economic problem in their model.
How important is discretionary spending in an economy that faces severe economic downturn
and fiscal stress? First, discretionary spending forms a significant component of the government
budget, assuming it to be constant in any analysis limits its role in the dynamics of the budget.1
In particular, to address the fiscal stress part of the dual problem, the fiscal authority can adapt
contractionary policy stance on discretionary spending, by cutting spending, to supplement any
increase in taxes. It is important to note that although cuts in discretionary spending cannot
eliminate all the risk factors that create uncertainty about budgetary outcomes, it can mitigate
the budgetary implications of those factors and in some cases “buy time” to create room for more
sustainable policies.
Moreover, because discretionary spending is “discretionary” it is more flexible and politically
feasible to cut in early stages of fiscal stress than its counterpart, mandatory spending.2 In fact
in the CBO (2013, 2014, 2015) choices of deficit reduction report suggest that, one option for
reducing the projected debt is by reducing discretionary spending. They outline two options. For
short term savings, discretionary spending can be cut through regular appropriation process and
for longer-term savings, lawmakers can set limits on the amount of appropriations that may be
provided in future years. This strategy is not readily available to policymakers in the case of
mandatory spending.
Second, if on the other hand government wants to address the recession component of the
dual problem, then discretionary spending can be used as an expansionary policy tool in response
to the economic downturn. Specifically, when tax policy and monetary policy are constrained due
to the presence high debt, fiscal limit and rising inflation respectively, both policies automatically
relinquish their role as instruments to offset any additional macroeconomic implication that may
1For instance, in the 2014 and 2015 fiscal year all discretionary government spending( (defense plus non-defense))
was about 34 percent of total spending
2In public finance, discretionary spending is government spending implemented through an appropriations bill.
This spending is an optional part of fiscal policy, in contrast to entitlement programs for which funding is mandatory
(Mandal (2007)).
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arise due to the realization of the exploding transfers. For instance, due to the high rising debt
and inflation, taxes can not fall to stimulate consumption neither can the monetary authority
cut policy rates to affect aggregate demand. However, since increases in government spending
contributes a dollar to aggregate demand an expansionary policy stance on discretionary spending
policy can serve as a plausible policy option that can mitigate some of the contractionary effects
of the exponentially rising transfer payments.
Finally, an often discounted factor in fiscal policy evaluation is the long-run relationship be-
tween private consumption and government spending, two important components of aggregate
demand determination. Indeed, the CBO argues that the implications of any policy and thus
discretionary government spending policy can vary according to the economic agents preferences
and priorities.3 On aggregate, discretionary government spending is not totally wasteful, it is can
be utility enhancing (Karass (1994); Kwan (2007); Gannelli and Tervala (2009)). This means the
degree of substitution(complementarity) between consumption and government spending matter
in fiscal policy effectiveness.4 Thus if designed properly, the long-run relationship between gov-
ernment spending and private consumption can serve as an additional channel to improve the
effectiveness government spending policy. Other fiscal policy instruments do not have this direct
characteristics with private agent behavior.
The points discussed above inherently raise two tradeoff issues: if policy objective on dis-
cretionary spending is focused on addressig the economic downturn by increasing discretionary
spending then this will put additional pressure on the budget. Moreover, depending on the com-
ponent of spending that is increased, the classic issue of crowding out of private consumption and
investment by government spending can deepen the downturn. if instead government cuts dis-
cretionary spending to serve as buffers to budgetary pressures then that will have direct negative
impact on aggregate demand. Both of these tradeoffs can have an amplifying or mitigating effect
on an economy that faces a dual problem of fiscal stress and economic downturn.
3See the Congressional Budget Office 2013 Choices for Deficit Reduction: An Update.
4For instance, as argued by Bailey (1971) the degree of substitutability between private and government con-
sumption plays a crucial role of determining the extent of the expansionary effects of government spending. See
also Barro (1981) and Bailey(1971) for a deeper discussion.
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3.1.1 DLW Model and Contribution to the Literature
Projections of any economy are events that are yet to happen and hence several uncertainty sur-
rounds them. Moreover, to telescope their implications into the present requires succint modelling
of economic and policy uncertainty. The case of the CBO’s projections and their corresponding
policy options for resolution of the projections are no different.
DLW recently develop an optimizing dynamic model capable of thoroughly capturing these
policy uncertainty and projections in a tractable way. To generate an economy that face both
fiscal stress and severe recession, I augment different endogenous policy options on discretionary
spending to their policy block in the model developed. Specifically, they model in a New Keynesian
framework, an economy that faces exponential transfer payments, fiscal limit and several layers
of policy monetary and fiscal uncertainty that seeks to resolve the growing debt after the fiscal
limit is reached. Transfer payments are modelled such that it switches from a stable regime to an
exponentially increasing regime at some unknown time. When in the exponentially rising regime,
transfers are financed through debt which in turn puts an upward pressure on taxes.
As taxes rising, policymakers face increasing political pressure and a rising probability of
reaching the fiscal limit. At the fiscal limit, either the fiscal authority defaults on its promised
transfer payments or monetary authority must adjust its policy to stabilize debt. There is a
possibility that the fiscal authority will not default on its promised transfer since defaulting is
politically costly, in such an instance, monetary policy must adjust the nominal interest rate less
than one-for-one with inflation. Since taxes are constant at the fiscal limit, growing transfers
obligations increase the price level until the real value of debt stabilizes.
A key finding in DLW is that how rising debt due to exponential rising transfer is resolved in
the future can impact current economic outcomes. In particular, the current and expected rise in
tax rate on capital and labor reduces consumption and output while the possibility of financing
the debt with higher inflation causes current inflation to increase well before the fiscal limit is hit.
Clearly, this outcome produces a dual problem of fiscal stress and economic downturn.
Despite the fact that the model in DLW capture and highlight very salient points about the
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policy implications of the rising transfer payments, it assumes discretionary government spending
to be constant.5 It is important to note that, although the assumption of constant discretionary
spending may be an innocuous one, it unambiguously limits the role of discretionary spending in
the policy analysis. Furthermore, DLW acknowledge that their work comprises only a small set of
possible policy scenarios which further underscores the importance of what this paper investigates
and its contribution to the literature.
The paper extends DLW by studying the role of an additional policy option, discretionary
spending policy, available to policymakers in addressing the consequences of explosive transfers.
Specifically, to understand the role and the implications of discretionary government spending
policy in the economy described above, I contrasts three discretionary spending policy scenarios
in the context DLW-like economy. The policy options considered include6:
1. A case where discretionary spending is constant so that it plays no policy role in the econ-
omy7;
2. A scenario where discretionary spending policy increases in response to recessions but gov-
ernment promises to cut it in the future when the fiscal limit is hit–run fiscal deficits today
to stimulate activity, but ”promise” to reduce deficits in the future; and
3. A case where in addition to raising taxes in response to increases in debt, discretionary
spending is used as an contractionary policy tool by cutting it in response to the increases
in debt– a case of complete contractionary policy.
As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of a particular policy depends on how consumers internal-
ize(absorb) government spending in their preferences matter. Indeed, the CBO argues that the
implications of any policy and thus discretionary government spending policy can vary accord-
ing to the economic agents preferences and priorities. Hence, in addition, I examine these policy
5Morever, in the DLW economy if instead discretionary spending was introduced into the model as an exogenous
process (simple AR(1) process) and hence it does not respond to the state of the economy it will be a redundant
equation.
6Fiscal policy is difficult to model, study and quantify its impact on the economy for several reasons (See Leeper
(2015)). Hence it is important to note that, these options/scenarios are by no means exhaustive of all the possible
scenarios, nonetheless, they highlight some important aspects of policy options available to policymaker in a broader
context.
7This is the case of DLW
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choices when discretionary spending is purely wasteful and when it is useful and utility enhancing.8
Two key finding emerge from the model: (i) although a particular policy stance– either
contractionary or expansionary– on discretionary government spending cannot eliminate the effects
and risks of the rising transfer payments, their use as additional policies can mitigate/worsen
these effects both in the short-run and the long-run; (ii) The effectiveness of a particular policy
stance on discretionary government spending depends critically on how households internalize
government spending in their utility– useful or wasteful. These results are central to understanding
the tradeoffs of choosing a particular discretionary spending policy over the other in an economy
faced with fiscal stress and severe recession.
3.2 Evidence of Long-run Relationship between C and G in the U.S
The goal of this section is to provide evidence of the usefulness of government spending at the
aggregate level in the U.S. Specifically, I focus on showing the degree of substitutability between
private consumption (C) and government spending (G). I then employ annual data for 1970 to
2015 from the World Development Indicators (World Bank (2015)) to estimate Eq. (3.1) or Eq.
(3.2):
ln(Ct/Gt) = β0 + β1 ln(P
g/P c) + et (3.1)
or
ln(P g/P c) = α0 + α1 ln(Ct/Gt) + ut (3.2)
Since the discussion focuses on the long-term relationship between private and government
consumption, Eq. (3.1) and (3.2) are cointegration regressions that relate the logarithm of private
and government consumption ratio, Ct/Gt, to their corresponding logarithm price ratio P
g/P c.9
The gradient parameter, β which is approximately equal to 1
α1
, governs the elasticity of substitu-
8See for example Ganelli and Tervela(2009); Kwan(2007); Karass(1994)
9The choice of equation specification for estimation depends on which series is more integrated Ng and Perron
(1997). I discuss this more under the series properties.
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tion between household and government consumption.10. Negative values of β mean that private
and government consumption are complements while a positive value means the two goods are
substitutes. I start by examining the time series properties of the log transformed data of the





It is important to note that the specifications in Eq. (3.1) and (3.2) are reduced form speci-
fications and do not have any structural interpretations. To lend structural interpretation to Eq.
(3.1) I follow Kwan(2007), Ogaki and Park (1997), Ogaki and Reinhart (1992), and Ogaki (1992)
and assume a representative consumer who gains utility from two goods, private and public. The






where Ce is given by
Ce = [θεtC
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The optimal consumption bundle Ce satisfies the equality condition between marginal rate of
substitution and relative price given the assumpition of time separability of the consumer’s utility

































The corresponding equation for the empirical estimation is then given as:
10It is important to note that in finite sample the estimates from the direct and reverse regressions may be far













Note that the parameter of interest here is α1.
3.2.1 Data and Estimation
I employ annual data for 1960 to 2015 from the World Development Indicators (World Bank
2015) for the United States. To obtain the the consumption ratio, Ct/Gt I divide, household final
consumption expenditure by general government final consumption expenditure, both in 2010
constant Dollars. In light of Kwan (2007), the corresponding prices P ct and P
g
t are computed as
the implicit price deflators which are constructed by dividing the nominal private and government
consumption series by their respective constant price series.
As standard in the literature, I begin by studying the time series properties of the constructed




t ). Figure 3.1 shows the time path of log consumption and price
ratio in the U.S. Individually, both series show strong persistence which suggest that they may be
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Figure 3.1: Policy Options: No Useful Gov-
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Figure 3.2: Correlation between consumption





Figure 3.2 provides preliminary correlation analysis of the two series for the full sample
11Formal unit root tests are provided in the appendix. Results from the unit root suggests that Eq. (3.2) is
adopted.
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period and sub-period. As shown in the figure, there is a consistent positive correlation between
the price and consumption ratios. This shows tendency of government and private consumption,
on aggregate, to be substitutes.
Estimation Results
Table 3.1 reports the cointegrating regression results from estimating Eq. (3.2). The table also
reports cointegrating results for sub-samples. It is important to check for robustness, hence three
different estimation methodologies–the fully modified ordinary least square (FM-OLS) by Phillips
and Hansen (1990); the canonical cointegrating regression (CCR) by Park (1992); and Stock and
Watson’s(1993) dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS)– are employed. These estimation methods
are are all asymptotically efficient procedures for estimating cointegration regressions.
Table 3.1: Cointegration Regressions: United States
FM-OLS CCR DOLS
α0 α1 α0 α1 α0 α1
1970 - 2015 -0.3651*** 0.5418*** -0.3670*** 0.5461*** -0.3712*** 0.5524***
(0.0401) (0.0740) (0.0352) (0.0678) (0.0397) (0.0728)
1980 - 2015 -0.4466*** 0.6811*** -0.4503*** 0.6894*** -0.4469*** 0.6902***
(0.0396) (0.0700) (0.0385) (0.0701) (0.0415) (0.0752)
1990 - 2015 -0.5378*** 0.8290*** -0.5334*** 0.8241** -0.5026*** 0.7732***
(0.0646) (0.1088) (0.0581) (0.1005) (0.0673) (0.1134)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. FM-OLS is Fully modified OLS; CCR is Canonical cointegrating regression;
and DOLS is Dynamic OLS. FM-OLS and CCR use Andrew’s automatic bandwith selection method in computing
the long-run variance matrix. DOLS includes one lead and one lag of the first difference of the regressors in the
augmented regression.
The parameter of interest here is the reciprocal of α̂1 given as
1
α̂1
. This value governs the
degree of substitution/complementarity between private and government consumption. Generally,
the estimated parameter values for α̂0 and α̂1 are stable across the estimation methods. The
positive sign and statistical significance of α̂1 across estimation methods for the full sample and sub-
sample period show that government spending on aggregate is a substitute to private consumption.
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Particularly, the value governing the degree of substitutability, 1
α̂1
ranges between 1.2 to 1.85. Since
1
α̂1
is great than 1, this implies the government spending on aggregate is a strong substitute in the
U.S in the long-run. This results is consistent with estimates from Kwan (2009)
Although, this section focuses on the long-run relationship between government spending and
consumption, our choices of estimation assumes that government spending is exogenous and hence
precludes cross equation restrictions that arise due to endogenous government policy. For instance
Fève, Matheronn, and Sahuc (2013), in a full information estimation model find that omitting
the countercyclical component of government spending policy when estimating the relationship
between private consumption and government spending can lead to lower estimates of comple-
mentarity. Their estimates however, do not explicitly consider the possible long-run relationship
between consumption and government spending.
Moreover, several empirical studies find that an increase in government spending crowds
in private consumption. The values of the degree of substitutability obtained in this section
do not favor this empirical finding. Instead, theoterical work have found that the possibility
of complementarity between private consumption and government spending favors the empirical
finding that increases in government spending crowds in private consumption.
In the model that follow, government spending is not exogenous, it is modelled as endogenous
thus it is important not to discount the aforementioned issues. To expand the analyse, the coun-
terfactual exercises conducted in the model section of the paper considers cases where government
spending is: (i) wasteful (ii) substitute to private consumption and (iii) complement to private
consumption.
3.3 The Economic Model
The analysis is conducted in an otherwise standard new Keynesian model. Nominal rigidities are
introduced using Rotemberg (1982) pricing by monopolistically competitive intermediate good
firms. The policy block is governed by Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) with a key introduction of
an additional fiscal policy choice in the form of different policy options of discretionary government
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spending. I also model government spending as utility enhancing.
3.3.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption (Ct), Labor hours (Nt),money (Mt),money


















where Et. is the expectation operator, conditioned on information available at time t, σ > 0,
η > 0, χ > 0, κ > and ϑ > 0 and Ct is a composite private consumption good consisting of differen-
tiated goods, cit , which is governed by the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator. Lastly the param-
eter αg allows government spending to be useful and governs the complementarity/substitutability
between private consumption Ct and public spending Gt.
12 Specifically if αg < 0, Gt is comple-
mentary to Ct while αg ≥ 0 means government spending Gt is a substitute to Ct. The case where
αg = 1 characterizes the perfect substitution explained in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). If
αg = 0, the model reduces to the standard real business cycle model.
13 The function V (Gt) is
to ensure that the marginal utility of government spending do not attain negative values when
αg < 0.












+ λtzt + (1− τt)(wtNt +RktKt−1) +
Dt
Pt
12See Fève, Matheronn, and Sahuc (2013), Ganelli and Tervela (2009), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Finn
(1998), McGrattan (1994). In the empirical model, I adopted the CES specification of utility which have been
considered by Bouakes and Rebei (2007), McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997). However, as mentioned by
Fève, Matheronn, and Sahuc (2013), both specifications yield the same log-linearized equilibrium conditions which
in this paper I use for the initial guess for the numerical solution. To allow for tractability I adopt the former
specification.
13See for instance Aiyarigari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993)
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where Kt−1 is the capital stock available to use in production at time t, wt is real wages paid
to labor, τt is the distorting tax rate common to both labor and capital, R
k
t is the real rental
rate of capital, Rt−1 is the nominal return to bonds, zt are lump-sum transfers promised by the
government, λt is the fraction of promised transfers actually received by the household and Dt is
nominal profits.
3.3.2 Optimality conditions
Consumption : (Ct + αgGt)
−σ = λt (3.9)
Labor : χNηt = λt(1− τt)wt (3.10)






























The production sector is made up two types of firms, monopolistically competitive intermediate








and hence minimizes its total cost, wtnt(i) + R
k
t kt(i) subject to the Cobb-Douglas production
technology.
Price setting








where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Profit maximization by the final goods







Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producing firm i chooses prices Pt(i) to maximize

























where ϕ governs adjustment cost, MCt(i) is real marginal cost. Price adjustment follows Rotem-








is that of Ireland (1997).
With costly price adjustment, the aggregate resource constraint is given as









3.3.4 Davig, Leeper, Walker Policy Block with Discretionary Spending Policy
The government finances purchases Gt and actual transfer delivered. λtzt with income tax rev-
enues, money creation, and the sale of one-period nominal bonds. The government’s flow budget















The rest of the policy blocks follows closely, DWL and Richter (2015). The policy block
encompasses several layers of uncertainty around tax, transfer, and monetary policy. In particular,
this policy formulation captures the non-stationary process of transfer payments as projected by



















1− q = 0.5
Figure 3.3: A graphical representation of policy evolution of the DLW economy augmented with government stance
on discretionary government spending policy (DGP).
Figure 3 describes graphically how the uncertainty unfolds. The fiscal authority sets transfer
payments exogenously according to a Markov chain; the economy starts at the black node with a
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stationary process of transfers, a choice of discretionary spending policy, active inflation targeting
(AM) by the central bank, and a tax policy that raises tax rates passively in response to an
increasing debt (PF). Governed with some positive probability pz, the transfer process switches
from its stationary regime into its non-stationary regime by moving from the black node to the
red node. It is assumed that non-stationary regime is an absorbing state, so that when the non-




∗ + ρzzt−1 + εt for Sz,t = 1
µzt−1 + εt for Sz,t = 2
(3.15)
0 < ρz < 1 and µ > 0 however βµ < 0 ensuring square summability. This formulation captures






The exponential growth in transfer is initially financed by new debt issuance, which is backed
by increasing tax rates. However, as emphasized by DLW, there is fiscal limit to the amount
of debt that can be financed through tax increases. This is due to either reaching the peak of
the Laffer curve or political resistance to tax hikes. To capture the fiscal limit, the fiscal limit is
modelled as setting τt = τFL for t ≤ T , where T is the date at which the economy hits the fiscal
limit and it is stochactic. Tax policy is then set according to
τt =
 τ̄(bt−1/b
∗)γ, for Sp,t = 1,Fiscal Limit doesn’t bind
τmax, for Sp,t ∈ {2, 3},Fiscal Limit bind
(3.16)
where b∗ is the target debt-output ratio and τ̄ is the steady state tax rate. In the light of
DLW, Davig, Leeper, Walker (2011), and Richter (2015) the probability of hitting the fiscal limit,
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pLt, is endogenously determined throught the logistic function
pFL,t = 1−
exp(η0 − η1(τt−1 − τ̄))
1 + exp(η0 − η1(τt−1 − τ̄))
where η0 and η1 > 0 pin down the intercept and slope of the logistic function. Thus the probability
of hitting the fiscal limit is increasing in taxes. Since taxes increases when debt increases (passive
response), the probability of hitting the fiscal limit increases with debt.











where active monetary policy is in regimes Sm,t ∈ {1, 3} and passive monetary policy is in
regime Sm,t = 2
Depending on the short-run goals of fiscal authority, discretionary spending policy can be set
to case 1 for contractionary policy or case 2 for expansionary policy goals:14




φB for Sp,t ∈ {1, 3}
Ḡ(bt−1/b̄)
φF for Sp,t = 2
(3.18)
where φB < 0 and φF = 0 so that discretionary spending is contractionary prior to the fiscal limit
and constant at the fiscal limit.15
Case 2: Systematic increase in government spending in response to economic downturn (Expan-
14There are more general formulation to the policy rules below (See for instance, McGrattan (1994) and Jones
(2002)) while Féve, Matheron, and Sahue (2013); Moura (2015) and Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) ) For
computational speed purposes I do not include the lag term (gt−1) in the policy rule for discretionary spending
as this will add to the state space and will significantly increase the computational time. Numerical analysis with
gt−1 for the fixed regime yielded similar qualitative results.
15In the CBO (2013) choices of deficit reduction report for instance, one option for reducing the projected debt
is reducing discretionary spending. They outline two options. For short term savings discretionary spending can
be cut through regular appropriation process and for longer-term savings, lawmakers can set limits on the amount





φC for St(g) ∈ {1, 3}
Ḡ(Yt/Ȳ )
φF for St(g) = 2
(3.19)
where φC < 0 and φF = 0. Notice that when φC = φF = 0 and the parameter governing the
usefulness of discretionary government spending in consumer utility, αg is zero then the model
collapses to the model in DLW.
At the fiscal limit (FL), tax policy becomes active (AF) so that it can not respond to debt
any longer. Policy combinations must adjust to stabilize debt. Specifically, if the fiscal authority
honors its promised transfers (AT), the monetary authority stabilizes debt by abandoning its
active targeting of inflation to a passive policy (PM). The economy then moves from the red node
to the yellow node in figure 3. Since the non-stationary transfer regime is absorbing, at the yellow
node, transfers continue to follow an unsustainable path, this leads to continued increases in debt
and, without a central bank response, higher inflation. The high inflation reduces the real value
of debt and allows the fiscal authority to avoid default on promised transfer (i.e. λ = 1).
However, if monetary authority decides to actively target inflation (AM), the fiscal authority
is forced to renege on its promised transfer (i.e. λ < 1) and the economy moves from the red node
to the green node. At the green node, reductions in the promised transfer should be sufficient
enough to stabilize real debt, so that the post-fiscal limit regimes produce paths that are consistent
with a long-run equilibrium. In both cases (green and yellow node), government concern is on
the long-run stabilization of debt hence, fiscal authority puts a cap on discretionary spending by
simply keeping it constant.
At fiscal limit, the monetary authority stabilizes debt and the fiscal authority reneges on its
transfer commitments with probability q and 1 − q respectively. This initial policy adjustment
is not invariant. After the fiscal limit is hit, policy evolves according to a first-order two-state
Markov chain with transition matrix P [st = j|st−1] = pij, i, j ∈ 2, 3 so that in each period either
the monetary or fiscal authority stabilizes debt when the fiscal limit binds. These realizations are
shown by movements between yellow and green node.
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3.3.5 Calibration
The study focuses on long-run policy uncertainty as in Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) thus
the model is calibrated in annual frequency. The household preference parameters are calibrated
as follows. In the baseline model, the relative risk aversion, σ and the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor η are set to 1 while the parameter governing the complementarity between government
spending and private consumption is set to -1.5 [Ganelli and Tervala (2009) and Fève, Matheron,
and Sahuc(2013)]. For substitutability between government spending and consumption is set to
1.83 in the baseline case. This value is obtained from the empirical study in section 2. The
parameter that determines the interest elasticity of real balances, κ is set to 2.6 [Chari, Kohoe
and McGrattan (2000)]. The annual real interest rate is set 2 percent so that the discount factor,
β = 0.9804. Meanwhile for real balances, ν is set such that the velocity in the deterministic
steady state, defined as cP/M , matches average U.S monetary base velocity at 2.4. This value is
consistent with Davig and Leeper (2006).
The price elasticity of demand and the Rotemberg adjustment cost coeffcient are set to 7.666
and 10 respectively. The parameter value of price elasticity of demand means firms markup the
prices of their goods over marginal cost by 15 percent
Table 3.2: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Name Symbol Value Parameter Name Symbol Value
Subtitutability b/n Ct & Gt αg [−2, 2] Inflation coefficient: active MP rule T/Y 1.5
Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/η 1 Inflation coefficient: passive MP rule G/Y 0
Elasticity of Intertemporal substitution 1/σ 1 Debt coefficient: passive fiscal rule b/Y 0.40
Price elasticity of demand θ 7.666 Prob. of moving to PM/AF/AT regime after FL q 0.5
Rotemberg Adjustment Cost Coef. ψ 10 Initial prob. of moving to PM/AF/AT regime after FL p22 0.5
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.10 Prob. of staying in AM/AF/PT regime after FL π33 0.99
Cost share of capital α 0.33 Prob. of non-stationary transfer occurring pzS 0.2
Steady-state gross inflation rate π̄ 0.02 AR coefficient: stationary transfer process ρZS 0.90
Steady-state gross nominal interest rate R̄ 0.04 Growth rate: non-stationary transfer process ρZS 1.01
Steady-state labor N̄ 0.04 Tax rate after FL τFL 0.244
Steady-state government spending share Ḡ/Ȳ 0.08 Output coefficient: government spending rule φY -1.2
Steady-sytate debt-to-GDP ratio b̄/Ȳ 0.385 Debt coefficient: government spending rule φB -0.05
For the policy block, the steady state government spending per out is set to 8 percent while
transfer per out is set to 9 percent.While in the stationary transfer regime, the coefficient governing
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the tranfer process is set to ρz = 0.9. The steady state tax rate is set such that the debt to output
ratio is consistent to its long term average of 0.385. Meanwhile the steady-state inflation rate,
p̄i is 2 percent. Prior to the reaching the fiscal limit, policies are “normal” hence tax policy is
passive and monetary policy is active (Sp = 1) with reaction coefficient γ = 0.2 and φA = 1.5.
Discretionary spending policy is endogenous and hence in the case where government spending
responds to deviation of output from its steadystate, φY is set to -1.2 while φB = −0.1 in the
case where it responds to debt. The values for φY and φB are set to generate sizeable changes
in government spending. The expected duration of the stationary regime is five year (pz = 0.8)
after which transfers grow at 1 percent per year once the switch from the stationary to the non-
stationary regime is realized, (µ = 1.01).
Even after transfers switches to a regime where it is rising exponentially, monetary and fiscal
policies remain the same until the economy reaches it fiscal limit. The probability of hitting, pFL
rises according the logistic function. The parameters governing the logistic function, η0 and η1
are set so that the initial probability of hitting the fiscal limit is 2 percent when τt = τ̄ and a 5
percent probability when τt = τ
FL
As explained, at the fiscal limit taxes can not rise anymore due political pressures or economic
reasons so taxes remain constant such that τmax = 0.24. This tax rate in the stationary regime of
transfer can support a steady-state debt to GDP ratio of 2.1, a debt to output level unsually high
and unseen in the U.S history. Post fiscal limit, taxes reliquinshes its policy role and government
cannot use it as a policy option to stabilize debt, hence two potential resolutions are allowed,
both of which occur with a 50 percent chance. The first possibility is a switch to passive monetary
policy, where the monetary authority simply pegs the nominal interest rate so that ρA = 0 and fiscal
authority continues to deliver fully promised transfers. The second resolution possibility requires,
fiscal authority to renege on promised tranfer payments since monetary policy here remains active.
In both scenarios, if government decides to pursue an expansionary discretionary spending
policy in the stationary regime then at the fiscal limit it promises to put a cap on expenditure
by keeping Gt constant and hence φ
B = φY = φ
F = 0, as a supplement to any of resolution
that is realized at the fiscal limit. On the other, if government takes a contrationary stands on
124
government expenditure in the stationary transfer regime in addition to increasing taxes then at
the fiscal limit it simply put a cap of expenditures by keeping it constant.
Clearly at the fiscal limit, a standalone passive monetary policy can not completely stabilize
debt as transfers continue on their explosive path. In order to stabilize debt, a recurring regime
change between the passive monetary regime that provides full amount of promised transfers and
the active monetary regime with reneging is allowed. Each regime is calibrated such that, the
regime where monetary authority adjusts policy by adopting a passive monetary policy has an
expected duration of 10 years and the regime where fiscal authority adjust policy by reneging on
promised transfer payments has an expected duration of 100 years.16
The full nonlinear model is solve numerically by employing the monotone map method
(MMM) described in Davig and Leeper (2006). See the Appendix
3.3.6 Simple Illustrative Example
Recall that government spending is introduced into the model so that it is useful and a sub-
stitute/complement to private consumption based on the empirical results in section 3.2. More
importantly, policy stance on discretionary government spending is endogenous, and thus fiscal
authority has the option of either increasing government spending in response to a recession or
cut spending in response to increasing debt.
Before presenting the result from the full model, I anaylze the fixed regime version of the
full nonlinear model. First, a simple analytical intuition is provided using the fixed regime with
lump-sum taxes and show how the degree of substitutability/complementarity between private
and government consumption interact with endogenous discretionary spending to affect policy
effectiveness. Second, I study impulse response functions following a government transfer shock
for the fixed regime.
For the simple analytical illustration, I assume a cashless simple productive economy without
capital. The model is as follows: a representative agent receives wages from work effort, lump-sum
16These values reflect the political reality that in the long-run some modificatios to entitlement benefits will
occur, but because of their politically toxic nature, debt revaluation always remains a possible financing outcome,
Richter (2015).
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transfers, pays lump-sum taxes (Zt) and chooses sequences of labor hours (Nt), consumption (Ct)
and a risk-free nominal bonds (Bt) which pays a gross interest rate Rt, to maximize
∑∞
t=0 U(Ct, Nt)
subject to Ct+Bt/Pt+Tt = Nt+Zt+Rt−1Bt−1/Pt so that the first order conditions are as follows:
(Ct + αgGt)
−1 = λt (3.20)
χNηt = λt (3.21)
where λt is the marginal utility of consumption.
The production sector of the economy is such that Yt = Nt and the market clearing condition
is given as Ct +Gt = Yt.
To allow for interpretive ease, the log-linearized versions of the model is Eq. (3.20), Eq
(3.21), the production function and the resource constraint are employed. I further make the
simplifying assumption of setting the steadystate level of discretionary government spending to
zero.17. Combining the log-linearized version of Eq. (3.20) and Eq. (3.21) yields:
ηn̂t = −(ĉt + αgĝt) (3.22)
meanwhile, the log-linearized version of the production function yields:
n̂t = ŷt = ĉt + ĝt
combining the log-linearized resource constraint and equation in Eq. (3.22), I obtain:
η(ĉt + ĝt) = −(ĉt + αgĝt)⇒ (1 + η)ĉt = −(α + η)ĝt (3.23)







17This is a special case of Ḡ > 0, see Ganelli and Tervala (2009) for similar modelling assumptions
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furthermore, employing the production function n̂t = ŷt and the resource constraint ŷt =







The critical part of Eq. (3.25) and (3.25) is the design of endogenous discretionary government
spending policy in responds to the state of the economy. In particular, whether it is designed to
respond in an expansionary fashion to the economic downtown component of the dual economic
problem or in a contractionary way in response to an increasing debt. To investigate the effects
of each policy option, I substitute the log-linearized version for each discretionary spending policy






























b̂St if Gt is contractionary
(3.27)
where φY < 0 while φB < 0. The variable ŷRt < 0 represents an economic downturn while the
variable b̂S > represents increasing debt.
The transmission mechanism at work when public and private consumption are substitutes
(complement) implies that an increase in government spending lowers (raises) the marginal utility
of household consumption. These results depend on the value of η (see Ganelli and Tervala (2009)).
Setting η to such η < |αg| yields the following:
• When public and private consumption are substitutes an increase (decrease) in government
spending aggravates (mitigates) the marginal disutility of increasig labor supply. It is there-
fore straightforward to see that, an expansionary (contractionary) policy on discretionary
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spending will cause contractionary (expansionary) macroeconomic effects– causing falls in
consumption, labor hours, and output.
• When public and private consumption are complements an increase (decrease) in government
spending mitigates (worsens) the marginal disutility of increasig labor supply. Hence, an
expansionary (contractionary) policy on discretionary spending will lead to (contractionary)
expansionary macroeconomic effects– causing increase in consumption, labor hours, and
output.
The budgetary implication of each policy stance of discretionary spending is unambiguous.
Irrespective of the path of debt, at each time t an expansionary policy choice on government
expenditure will put debt at a higher point relative to a policy choice that aims to cut government
spending (contractionary) or keep spending constant. It is however, important to note that these
spending policies can only either mitigate or exercebate budgetary risks but can not fully eradictate
these risks.
3.3.7 Numerical results: No fiscal Limit
This section provides numerical results for the fixed regime version of the model described in
section 3.3 without fiscal limit. Specifically, conditioning on the active monetary policy and
passive fiscal policy with a fixed policy choice on discretionary spending, I conduct two exercises.
First, I compare the implications of each policy choice on discretionary spending policy by studying
impulse response functions of the macro-variables in the model following a government transfer
shock. Second, for each of the policy stance on discretionary government spending, the role of
the degree of the intra-temporal substitution between government and private consumption is
examined to evaluate the efficacy of each policy choice.
3.3.8 Transmission Mechanism
Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 compare the implications of discretionary spending policy choices in the
economy following a 10% government transfer shock for the case where government spending is
nonuseful (αg = 0), useful but a substitute to private consumption with αg = 1.83 and useful but
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complementaryto consumption with αg = −1.5 consumption respectively. Additionally, figures
3.7 to 3.10 considers one discretionary policy at a time and show how the degree of substitutabil-
ity/complementarity between consumption and government spending affects each policy.
To better understand the role of discretionary spending and its transmission channels, I
compare all the results to the scenario where discretionary spending policy has a limited role.
That is, discretionary government spending is assumed to be constant so that it can neither be
used as an additional tool to finance debt through contractionary measures nor can it be employed
in an expansionary fashion to stimulate the economy in response to an economic downturn (φY = 0
and φB = 0). In addition, government spending in this case is assumed to be non-useful/wasteful
so that αg = 0.
For the case where government spending is constant and does not respond endogenously to
the state of the economy, a positive shock on transfer payments financed by higher distortionary
taxes on the incomes of factors of production, labor and capital. This generates a disincentive for
agents to work and invest directly leading to gradual fall in labor hours and investment which in
turn causes output and consumption to fall steadily. The steady fall in output over time will raise
marginal cost and hence inflation. This scenario is given by the black solid line in all the figures.
Discretionary spending policy under Non-useful government spending
Figure 3.4 compares the efficacy of each endogenous discretionary spending policy given that
government spending is non-useful. The blue dash line represents contractionary discretionary
spending – fiscal authority cuts spending in response to increasing debt. The red line shows the
effect of transfer shock when policy choice on government spending is expansionary.
Assuming fiscal authority does not only finance the higher transfer payment by nominal debt
and distortionary taxes but also cuts discretionary spending in response to rising debt so that
discretionary spending serves as a lump-sum tax, two effects will be generated. First, because
government spending contributes an immediate dollor to aggregate demand, reduction in spending
will lead to a fall in output in the short and medium run relative to when government spending is
constant. Second, in the longer run, a combination of crowding in of private consumption, increase
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in labor hours worked and less pressure on distortionary taxes due to the cuts in government
spending in response to higher transfer payment causes a stronger rebound of consumpiton, labor
hours worked, capital and consequently output compared to the case where spending is constant.
On the other hand, if fiscal authority instead decides to address the economic downturn
component of the consequence of the transfer shock and conducts expansionary discretionary
spending policy by responding to output loss then the opposite effect will occur. Specifically, if
in response to the economic downturn caused by the shock to transfer payment described above
government increases discretionary government spending, then this will lead to an even higher
distortionary taxation labor and capital as well as severe crowding out of private consumption.
Both effects will further exacerbate the economic downturn in the long-run.
Thus when government is non-useful/wasteful, contractionary discretionary government spend-
ing policy mitigates the contractionary effects of the transfer shock. Expansionary discretionary
government policy on the other hand worsens the economic effects of the transfer shock.
Discretionary Spending Policy under Useful Government Spending
I now consider the efficacy of discretionary spending policy when government spending is useful and
a substitute/complement to private consumption. In this case, changes in discretionary spending
will not only have the standard wealth effect on households since other transimission channels now
come into play. As explained earlier in the analytical example in section 3.6, given the standard
calibration of the household preference parameters, changes in government spending is capable of
affect the marginal utility of household labor effort and consumption.
Discretionary Government policy when Gt and Ct are Substitutes: Figure 3.5 compares the
impulse responses for policy options on discretionary government spending following a transfer
shock when government and private consumption are substitutes. When the transfer shock hits,
a discretionary government spending policy that responds to output will exercebates the contrac-
tionary effects of the transfer shock. This is because when αg = 1.83 an increase in government
spending lowers the marginal utility of private consumption leading to further falls in consump-
tion. Moreover, the increas in government spending causes additional pressure taxes which further
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affect labor hours worked and investment. The negative effect on consumption, labor, and capital
leads to a fall in output.
In constrast, if fiscal authority cuts government spending as an additional financing source
to the increasing debt, the marginal utility of private consumption increases and thus there is
crowding in consumption. Additionally, the cuts in government spending reduces the upward
pressure on distortionary taxes as it serves as an additional financing source. This means lower
distortionary taxes on productive capital and labor hence less fall in capital and labor hours
worked. Consequently, the crowding in of consumption alongside the positive effects on labor
hours and capital mitigates the negative impacts of the transfer shock compared to the case of
expansionary or constant government spending.
Discretionary Government Policy when Gt and Ct are Complementarity: Figure 3.6 compares
marginal effects of the three discretionary policy options when government spending is comple-
mentary to private consumption. When government spending policy is expansionary, standard
wealth effects makes the household agent poorer due to higher taxes. However, because govern-
ment spending is a complement to private consumption, the marginal utility gains from increasing
consumption following an increase government spending can mitigate some of the wealth effects.
There is therefore gains in consumption, labor, capital, and hence output relative to the case where
government spending is constant following the transfer shock. A contractionary policy stance on
government spending generates the opposite effects.
Role of the degree of substitutability: Figure 3.7 and 3.8 show the role of the degree of sub-
stitutability between government spending and consumption given that discretionary government
spending contractionary and expansionary respectively. From figure 3.7, it is clear that contrac-
tionary spending policies improve when substitutability between consumption and government
spending increases. On the other hand, as shown in figure 8 the lower degrees of substitutability
between government spending and consumption improves the efficacy of expansionary government
spending policy.
Role of the degree of complementarity: Figure 6 and 7 show the role of the parameter that
governs the degree of complementarity of discretionary government spending in the utility function.
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The qualitative analysis above for the fixed regime emphazises two important points. First,
different categories of spending government chooses to cut or increase in response to a debt-induced
recession can have mitigating or worsening effect on the recession. Second, for a particular policy
stance government takes on discetionary spending the degree of complementarity of spending in
the household utility can either a mitigating or worsening effect on the economic downturn.
3.4 Numerical result: full non-linear model
I now turn to the full nonlinear model described in section 3. In this section, I explore the role
of discretionary spending policy as additional policy and its impact on the consequences of ex-
plosive transfers by employing counterfactual exercises that condition on a particular monetary,
tax, transfer and a choice of discretionary spending policy regime as well as Monte Carlo simula-
tions. Moreover, the study is conducted while accounting for the explicit role of the transmission
mechanishm (utility enhancing channel, αg 6= 0) of each discretionary spending policy.
3.4.1 Equilibrium transition paths
I start the analysis from normal times, in this context defined such that monetary authority targets
inflation actively while fiscal authority passively adjusts tax rate to stabilize debt and deliver in
full stationary transfer payments. The counterfactual analysis thus conditions on normal times.
However, as descibed in figure 3.3, in period 5 although monetary policy and tax policy remain
active and passive respectively, transfers switch to its non-stationary path (Sz = 2) as in Eq.
(3.14). To clearly understand the transmission mechanism and marginal effects of discretionary
spending policy, all simulations results are compared to the results from the baseline model where
discretionary spending is non-useful (αg = 0) and constant (i.e. φ
Y = φB = 0)–this is the case
describe in DLW.
Figure 3.11 shows the economic implications of exploding transfer conditional on the initial
policy mix for the baseline case. Note that real debt and hence tax rates rise due to steady increase
in transfer payment when it switches to its nonstationary path. The rising distortionary taxes
levied against the incomes of factors of production discourages labor hours worked and the level
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of investment. This causes reductions in labor and capital. The fall in labor and capital leads to a
decline in both consumption and output. Declines in consumption usually leads to reductions in
inflation, however, the possibility of moving to a regime where debt is revalued leads to a steady
increase in expected and hence realized inflation.
Essentially, in the baseline case with constant government spending, rising transfer payments
generates a dual economic problem of systematic economic downturn and fiscal stress.
Discretionary spending as an additional policy
Here discretionary spending is now introduced as an additional endogenous policy tool. Specifi-
cally, depending on the policy objective, government may choose to increase discretionary spending
in response to a recession irrespective of debt pressures described in Eq. (3.26) or in addition to
taxation, cut current spending in response to increasing debt pressures as in Eq.(3.27). These pol-
icy choices on discretionary spending are studied in the context where: (i) government spending is
wasteful/non-useful; (ii) useful but a substitute to consumption; and (ii) useful and complementary
to private consumption.
Figures 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 describes the cases where government spending is wasteful, a sub-
stitute, and a complement to private consumption respectively. The blue dashed lines represents
a contractionary discretionary spending policy choice while the red line represents a discretionary
spending policy that is expansionary in nature. To appreciate the marginal contribution of each
policy choice of discretionary spending, the results are compare to the case where governemnt
spending is constant.
Non-useful government spending and endogenous spending policy: Figure 3.13 charac-
terizes consequences of the exploding transfer for the case where government spending is wasteful
(αg 6= 0) but responds endogenously either to output or debt. It is clear that regardless of the
policy stance on discretionary government spending, the economic consequences of the exploding
transfers are present. However, when government spending is wasteful and responds endogenously
to the economic down by increasing government spending (red line), there are additional standard
crowding out effects on private consumption and investment. This deepens the fall in consump-
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tion and capital. Although it is expected that labor will be substituted for consumption when
government spending is increased, the effect of the persistent rise in tax rates on labor offsets this
substitution effect. Thus there is no change in labor hours and hence output.
In constrast, if fiscal authority decides to additionally finance the increase debt by cutting
discretionary spending (φB 6= 0), this will lead to crowding in of private consumption since the
competition of resources by government with household is mitigated–this is given as the blue
dashed lines. However, these cuts in public spending virtually have no impact on labor or capital
as the impact of high taxes dominates. Additionally, since government spending forms an essential
component of output in the economy, a contractionary policy choice on it will directly impact
aggregate demand negatively. Thus, even with the effect of crowding in of consumption the direct
negative impact due to cuts discretionary spending causes a deeper trough for output relative to
the case of constant and expansionary spending.
Useful Government Spending: The empirical estimates in section 3.2 shows that public spend-
ing and private consumption are strong substitutes and hence an increase in government consump-
tion crowds out private consumpiton. Empirical studies however, find that private consumption
rises after an increase in government spending. Edgeworth complementarity between private and
government consumption has been cited as a factor contributing the positive response of private
consumption. Moreover, Fève, Matheron and Sahuc (2013) show that due to cross-equation restric-
tions an omission endogenous government spending at the estimation leads to an underestimation
of the degree of complementarity and the long-run government multiplier. The empirical estima-
tion in section 3.2 omits the endogenous feedback channel of government policy in the estimation
procedure.
To expand the analyses on the role of discretionary spending policy, this section assume that
private and government spending are complements and set αg < 0. Policy choices on discretionary
spending can now have additional impact on household consumption and labor supply through
the utility (disutility) it generates directly for housholds. That is, the standard wealth effects
that causes crowding in or crowding of private consumption in the case of wasteful government
spending are not the only channels at work. Concretely, alongside the baseline calibration of the
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household preference parameters, αg is set such that η + αg < 0, this ensures that an increase in
government spending leads to an increase in private consumption.18
In order to achieve this, I conduct the same numerical exercises as in the case where private
and public spending are substitutes for the case where both goods are complements. For the
case complementarity, αg is set to a value of -1.5.
19 For the ease of discussion, I present results
from the nonlinear impulse response when private and government consumption are complements.
Specifically, I compare the three policy options on discretionary spending policy while assuming
complementarity. Second, for each policy I examine the role of substitutability/complementarity.
(i) Substitutability and endogenous government spending policy: Figure 3.13 shows the role and
implications of fiscal policy choices on discretionary spending when government spending is useful
and a substitute to private consumption, αg = 1.83. Here, since government spending is a substi-
tute to private consumption, an expansionary government spending policy reduces the marginal
utility of consumption and increases disutility of labor. Thus in addition to the consequences of
the transfer payments, expansionary discretionary spending policy causes both consumption and
labor to fall compared to the case of a constant government spending. Moreover, the increase in
government spending further crowds out captial leading to a deeper fall in capital. The fall in
capital, consumption, and output means a deeper reduction in output relative to the case where
govenment spending is constant.
A contractionary government spending on the other hand has the opposite effect. Although
this policy mitigates the fall in consumption, the wealth effects caused by rising taxes are very
strong and offsets the positive impacts of the policy. Thus there is seemingly no effect on labor
and capital. The increase in consumption is not enough to mitigate any falls in output.
If government instead chooses to supplement taxation in financing the increase debt by cutting
discretionary government spending, then this will lead to crowding in of private consumption since
the competition of resources by government with household is mitigated. However, these reductions
in government spending virtually have no impact on labor or capital as the impact of high taxes
18It is easy to inspect this from from Eq. (3.24) and 3.(25). That is from these equations the restriction η+αg < 0
means increasing government spending generates a simultaneous increase in private consumption and labor hours.
19This value is in the neighborhood of estimates from Fève et al. (2013)
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dominates. Moreover, government spending forms an essential part of final consumption in the
economy hence cuts in it will directly impact aggregate demand negatively. Thus, even with the
effect of crowding in of consumption the direct negative impact cuts in government spending have
on aggregate demand worsens the fall in output compared to the case where spending is kept
constant. This fall is however maginal as compared to the case where government is increased in
spending in response to the the recession.
(ii) Complementarity and endogenous government spending: Figure 14 characterizes the role and
implications of fiscal policy choices on discretionary spending when public spending is useful and
complementary to private consumption. Specifically, despite the extra crowding out effect on capi-
tal, persistent tax pressures, the endogenous increase in useful government spending increases labor
hours worked and consumption–albeit small through the marginal utility channel. Hence, although
the devasting effects of the transfer shock are present, an expansionary government spending pol-
icy mitigates the severity of the economic downturn relative the case where government spending
is simply kept constant.
In constrast, if fiscal authority instead chooses to supplement taxation in financing the increase
debt by cutting government spending, then this will lead to crowding in of private consumption
since the competition of resources by government with household is mitigated. Moreover, since
government spending is complementary, contractionary government spending policy increases the
disutility of work thus there is a marginal fall in labor hours worked. Additionally, cuts in gov-
ernment spending directly impacts aggregate demand negatively through the resource constraint.
Thus, a contractionary policy choice on discretionary government spending leads to a more severe
economic downturn if government spending is complementary.
3.4.2 Quantitative Analysis
The numerical results in Section 4.1 illustrates the expectational effects of the possibility of reach-
ing the fiscal limit. The result are however, based on a specific sequences of policy regimes and
thus excludes alternative policy scenarios. In order to demonstrate the spectrum of outcomes I fol-
low DLW and Ricter (2015) and conduct 50000 Monte Carlo simulations of the model by drawing
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sequences of regimes and transfers shocks. The simulations starts from the initial policy regime
of active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy, stationary transfer and a choice on discretionary
spending policy.
Figure 15 shows 10th and 90th percentile bands of time paths for selected variables for the
baseline case where discretionary spending has a limited row. It clear that over the short run (i.e.
in the first 10 years) when the probability of hitting the fiscal limit is low, irrespective of the policy
option on discretionary spending, there are moderate deviations from the stationary distribution–
with low debt and inflation rates. This is because although there is a chance of hitting the fiscal
limit, the initial probability of reaching the fiscal limit is low and economic agents therefore expect
the drastic policy adjestments to take place far into the future and consequently heavily discount
these outcomes.
However, once past the short run effects and the probability of reaching fiscal limit rises,
outcomes can range from very moderate to extreme fiscal stress coupled with high inflation and
deep economic downturn. The large spectrum of outcomes shows the uncertainty surrounding the
fiscal limit and the realization of nonstationary transfers. Specifically, the fiscal limit can be hit
and transfers can switch to a non-stationary process at any point or not occur at all.
Figures 15, 16 and 17 plots the 10th and 90th percentile bands of time paths for selected
variables with discretionary spending as an additional policy tool for the case where α = 0,
α = 1.83, and αg = −1.5 respectively. In all the figures both the short run and long run effects
are present irrespective of the policy choice on discretionary spending. Generally, expansionary
policy choice on discretionary spending extends the moderate deviations from steady levels and
dispersion in the distribution and dispersion in the distribution regardless of government spending
relationship with private consumption. The most notable effect is shown in figure 17 for the
case where government spending is a substitute to consumption. In the figure, when government
spending is a substitute to private consumption, an expansionary government spending policy
extends the moderate contractionary effects for roughly another 5 years.
This short run effect of expansionary policy on discretionary spending when αg = 1.83 is
rather puzzling. This puzzling effect can however be explained through the expectational channel
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as agents expect that a cap will be placed on government spending that is substitutable to private
consumption will be kept constant. Economic agents therefore discount this optimism to the
present which in extends the moderate contractionary period.
However, over time when the probability of reaching the fiscal limit increases and fiscal
authority continues to conduct expansionary discretionary spending policy, this will lead to a
more severe contractionary effect for the case where αg = 0 in figure 16 and αg = 1.83 in figure 17.
Specifically, as shown in figure 17 the long run effect of introducing expansionary discretionary
spending to mitigate the economic downturn component of the dual economic problem can lead to
devastating outcomes– causing output to fall to double digit while raising the debt to output ratio
to almost 125 percent. Although, the scenarios studied in this paper is not exhaustive, even with
expansionary discretionary policy, when agents condition on policy adjustments that stabilize the
debt to output ratio, the debt/output ratio never reaches the levels projected by the CBO.
Contractionary policy choice on discretionary spending on the other hand have very small
impact on the dispersion of the distributions relative to its expansionary counterpart, but it keep
the debt to output ratio at decent rates below the 100 percent mark for all values of αg. This
long-run outcome of tightening of discretionary spending policy as an additional choice to reducing
the debt/output ratio is consistent with projections by the CBO.
To give a panoptic view of the short and long run effects of a particular stance on discretionary
government spending, table 3 below depicts the computed averages of output loss from the 10th
and 90th percentile band. The short-run average is computed over a period of 10 years while the
long-run average is computed using a 25 year period after the first 10 years.20
Table 3 highlights two points. First, the short run efficacy of expansionary spending policy
compared to the more conservative counterpart of cutting government spending. Second, contrac-
tionary spending policies such as automatic cuts in g as shown can in the long run mitigate the
economic downturn while keeping debt below 100%. On the other hand, increases in spending
even with the promise of holding it constant in the long-run can have the opposite effect.
20These horizons are chosen to closely match CBO projections horizons.
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Table 3.3: Short and Long Run Effect of Policy Options on Discretionary Government Spending
SHORT/MEDIUM RUN EFFECT
Avg. output loss Avg. output loss Avg. output loss
Discretionary outcomes under outcomes under outcomes under
Spending Type Constant G Contractionary G Expansionary G
90th 10th 90th 10th 90th 10th
Wasteful, αg = 0 [-2.90 -0.04] [-2.90 -0.04] [-1.82 -0.04]
Useful, αg = 1.83 — [-3.04 -0.03] [-0.96 -0.05]
Useful, αg = −1.5 — [-2.77 -0.05] [-2.14 -0.03]
LONG RUN EFFECT
Wasteful, αg = 0 [-7.66 -1.65] [-7.26 -1.67] [-8.04 -1.70]
Useful, αg = 1.83 — [-8.00 -1.49] [-9.13 -2.37]
Useful, αg = −1.5 — [-6.58 -1.85] [-7.09 -1.36]
Notes: 10 year average output loss under the two discretionary government spending policy ac-
tions when varying the degree of complementarity of government spending in the consumer utility
function. The computations are based on the fixed policy regimes and they are percentage points
deviation from the steadystate output following a 10% government transfer shock. The average
output loss when there is no discretionary spending policy action is -0.2594
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have extended Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) by introducing discretionary
spending as an additional policy instrument available to policymakers for addressing the dual
problem of fiscal stress and recession in their model. First, I provide evidence of useful government
spending in U.S. Second, incorporating useful government spending in the household utility, I study
how expansionary/contractionary policy choices on discretionary government spending impact the
consequences of an explosive transfer regime. Two broad results emerge:
1. although a particular policy stance– either contractionary or expansionary– on discretionary
government spending can not eliminate the effects and risks of the rising transfer payments,
their use as additional policies can mitigate/worsen these effects both in the short-run and
the long-run;
2. The effectiveness of a paticular policy stance on discretionary government spending depends
critically on how households internalize government spending in their utility– useful or waste-
ful.
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These results are central to understanding the tradeoffs of choosing a particular policy on dis-
cretionary spending over the other in an economy faced with a dual problem of fiscal stress and
severe recession. Additionally, the results serves as robustness check to the results found in DLW
since it expands the policy options available to government.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of different discretionary spending policy choices on the consequences of transfer payment shock
when government spending is non-useful (αg = 0)


















































































Figure 3.5: Effects of different discretionary spending policy choices on the consequences of transfer payment shock
when government spending is useful but a substitute to private consumption (αg = 1.83)
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Figure 3.6: Effects of different discretionary spending policy choices on the consequences of transfer payment shock
when government spending is useful but a complement to private consumption (αg = −1.5)























































































Figure 3.7: The efficacy of contractionary discretionary government policy under different degrees of substitutability
between private and government consumption
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Figure 3.8: The efficacy of expansionary discretionary government policy under different degrees of substitutability
between private and government consumption





















































































Figure 3.9: The efficacy of contractionary discretionary spending policy under different degrees of complementarity
between private and government consumption
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Figure 3.10: The efficacy of expansionary discretionary spending policy under different degrees of complementarity
between private and government consumption

























































Figure 3.11: Nonlinear impulse response functions of selected variable in response to government transfer payments
switching from its stationary regime (Sz = 1) to a non-stationary regime (Sz = 2) while assuming discretionary
spending policy to be useful and a complements to private consumption (αg = 1.83). The analysis is carried out
conditioning on active monetary, passive tax, active transfers and a choice of discretionary government spending
policy (contractionary or expansionary). Values represent deviations from each simulation’s stochastic steady state
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Constant G Contractionary G Expansionary G
Figure 3.12: Nonlinear impulse response functions of selected variable in response to government transfer payments
switching from its stationary regime (Sz = 1) to a non-stationary regime (Sz = 2) while discretionary spending
policy is assumed to be non-useful (αg = 0). The analysis is carried out conditioning on active monetary, passive tax,
active transfers and a choice of discretionary government spending policy (contractionary or expansionary).Values
represent deviations from each simulation’s stochastic steady state
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Constant G Contractionary G Expansionary G
Figure 3.13: Nonlinear impulse response functions of selected variable in response to government transfer payments
switching from its stationary regime (Sz = 1) to a non-stationary regime (Sz = 2) while assuming discretionary
spending policy to be useful and a substitute to private consumption (αg = 1.83). The analysis is carried out
conditioning on active monetary, passive tax, active transfers and a choice of discretionary government spending
policy (contractionary or expansionary). Values represent deviations from each simulation’s stochastic steady state
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Constant G Contractionary G Expansionary G
Figure 3.14: Nonlinear impulse response functions of selected variable in response to government transfer payments
switching from its stationary regime (Sz = 1) to a non-stationary regime (Sz = 2) while assuming discretionary
spending policy to be useful and a complements to private consumption (αg = −1.5). The analysis is carried out
conditioning on active monetary, passive tax, active transfers and a choice of discretionary government spending
policy (contractionary or expansionary). Values represent deviations from each simulation’s stochastic steady state
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Figure 3.15: Monte Carlo simulation Baseline Model with Constant Government Spending and αg = 0
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Figure 3.16: Monte Carlo simulation with wasteful Government Spending, αg = 0
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Figure 3.17: Monte Carlo simulation with substitute government spending, αg = 1.83
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Figure 3.18: Monte Carlo simulation with complementary government spending, αg = −1.5
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D.1 Steady State Values
Equations characterizing the steadystate equation of the system. Variables without time subscripts
represent the steadystate values.
FOC Capital:
rk =



















i = δk (D.6)
Production Function:
y = kαn1−α (D.7)
Aggregate Resource Constraint:






Velocity of Money Definition:
m = c/vel (D.10)
FOC Money:
ν = mκ(c+ αgg)
−σ(r − 1)/r (D.11)
Government Budget Constraints:
b =




a = m+ rb (D.13)
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D.2 Nonlinear Solution Algorithm
The model is solved using the monotone map method from Coleman (1991) which is explained
in Davig and Leeper (2006). Richter, Throckmorton and Walker (2013) provides a very flexi-
ble routine (Matlab, Mex and Fortran codes) that explains and implements the monotone map
method.
1 Discretize the state space around the non-stochastic steady state for each state variable (i.e.,
∆t = bt−1, Rt−1Kt−1, zt, Sz,t, Sp,t)





j (∆t) = πt) for j = 0. Decision rules for other endogenous variables can be obtained
using the resource constraint.
3 At each point in the state space, substitute these decisions rules into the household’s FOC.
t+ 1 endogenous variables depend on ∆t+1. Numerical integration is used to integrate over
exogenous variables gt+1, Sz,t+1and, St+1. This procedure yields updated values for the D.R
(e.g,ĥπj+1(∆t) = πt)
4 Repeat step (3) until the decision rules converge at every point in the state space (e.g.,
|ĥπj (∆t)− ĥπj+1(∆t)|< ε
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